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"COMPUTER MALPRACTICE" AND OTHER LEGAL PROBLEMS
POSED BY COMPUTER "VAPORWARE"
I. INTRODUCTION
The computer hardware' and software 2 trade is extremely compli-
cated in that manufacturers, distributors and retailers must contend with
thousands of available computer systems and parts, various financing
and pricing concerns, training and retaining salespeople and much
more.3 Nonetheless, the picture has recently become further clouded by
1. The term "computer hardware" describes the physical computer equip-
ment. Typically, the hardware comprising a "personal computer system" con-
sists of a "central processing unit"-the main body of the computer housing the
processing circuitry and disk drives-, a video display monitor, and a printer.
See Note, Copyright Infringement of Computer Programs: A Modification of the Substantial
Similarity Test, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1264, 1264 n.1 (1984); Management Sys. Assoc.
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 762 F.2d 1161, 1163 n.2 (4th Cir. 1985). The
personal computer system is also referred to as a "microcomputer," because it is
sufficiently compact to fit on top of a desk.
Some additional types of computer systems are: (1) "laptops," which are
portable and light enough to fit on the user's lap; (2) "minicomputers," which
are somewhat larger, faster, and have considerably more storage capacity than
microcomputers; and (3) "mainframes," which are faster and have more storage
capacity than minicomputers, and which are so large that they sometimes occupy
entire rooms. Further, some computers are not readily recognizable as such;
some computers are merely "black boxes" which accompany, or are built into,
high technology equipment such as industrial robots, CAT scanners, and elec-
tronic fuel injection systems.
2. Computer "software" essentially is that intangible part of a computer
system which is not hardware. See Management Sys. Assoc., Inc. v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 762 F.2d 1161, 1163 n.2 (4th Cir. 1985); Bender, Software Protec-
tion: The 1985 Perspective, 7 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 405, 407 (1985); Note, supra
note 1, at 1264 n.1.
Software comprises at least two classes of subject matter: computer pro-
grams, which are the operating instructions communicated to the computer by
the user-for example, word processing and spread sheet programs, games,
telecommunications packages, and many others-, and data bases, which are
computer-readable representations of information-for example, customer lists,
written documents and stored graphics. See Telex Corp. v. IBM, 367 F. Supp.
258, 274 (N.D. Okla. 1973); Bender, supra at 407.
The Copyright Act refers to a computer program as "a set of statements or
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring
about a certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
3. The multitude and complexity of problems encountered by members of
the computer industry are analogous to the problems encountered by members
of other fast-paced businesses and professions, such as commodities trading and
some areas of the medical profession. Consequently, the computer industry
"burns out" its members within a relatively short period of time. See Burnout: Is
This Fast-Track Market Melting Down Its Talent Pool?, Computer & Software News,
Nov. 9, 1987, at 139 [hereinafter Burnout].
(835)
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a growing number of lawsuits brought by dissatisfied purchasers against
computer vendors.4
4. Computer purchasers generally become dissatisfied with their systems
when the hardware or software is "dead on arrival" (DOA) that is, completely
non-functional due to a manufacturing or design defect, or where the hardware
or software does not accomplish all of the tasks the salesperson represented that
it would, or some combination of the above. At one point during the infancy of
the computer industry, some experts estimated that as many as forty percent of
all systems failed. Chatlos Sys. v. National Cash Register Corp., 670 F.2d 1304,
1307 n.l (3d Cir. 1982) (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
Although most computer manufacturers, distributors and retailers attempt
to resolve problems encountered by their customers or settle litigation prior to
trial, many cases have indeed gone to trial. See Graphic Sales, Inc. v. Sperry
Corp., 824 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1987) (lessee denied recovery against manufac-
turer under fraud theory); Hunter v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 798 F.2d 299 (8th
Cir. 1986) (buyer denied recovery under breach of express and implied warran-
ties claims, because, under Arkansas law, manufacturer's warranty disclaimer
was neither inconspicuous nor unconscionable); RRX Indus., Inc. v. LabCon,
Inc., 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985) (buyer recovered consequential damages from
software seller for breach of contract; software is "good" under U.C.C.); Con-
solidated Data Terminals v. Applied Digital Data Sys., 708 F.2d 385 (9th Cir.
1983) (distributor recovered consequential damages from manufacturer for
breach of express warranty); Convoy Co. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 672 F.2d 781
(9th Cir. 1982) (lessee recovered lease payments, costs of employees' additional
labor, plus interest from manufacturer for breach of contract); Dunn Appraisal
Co. v. Honeywell Information Sys., Inc., 687 F.2d 877 (6th Cir. 1982) (lessee
recovered, for breach of contract and fraud, labor and costs of materials for con-
verting data to be used on manufacturer's defective system); Glovatorium, Inc.
v. National Cash Register Corp., 684 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1982) (buyer recovered
compensatory and punitive damages from manufacturer under fraud theory);
Iten Leasing Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 684 F.2d 573 (8th Cir. 1982) (where non-
vital part of computer fails, buyer entitled only to out-of-pocket expenses, not
revocation of acceptance); Earman Oil Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 625 F.2d 1291
(5th Cir. 1980) (lessee denied recovery under misrepresentation, breach of con-
tract and breach of warranty claims where contract limited liability and dis-
claimed warranties in conscionable manner); Tilden Fin. Corp. v. Palo Tire
Serv., 596 F.2d 604 (3d Cir. 1979) (summary judgment for lessor); Triangle Un-
derwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979), aff'd after re-
mand, 651 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1981) (summary judgment for manufacturer
precluded by fraud claim); Clayton Brokerage Co. v. Teleswitcher Corp., 555
F.2d 1349 (8th Cir.) (lessee recovered damages for fraud), aff'd, 562 F.2d 1137
(8th Cir. 1977) (en banc); United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674 (2d
Cir. 1966) (computer engineering difficulty not excuse for breach of contract);
Sperry Rand Corp. v. Industrial Supply Corp., 337 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1964)
(buyer granted rescission and damages for breach of implied warranty); Analysts
Int'l Corp. v. Recycled Paper Prods., Inc., No. 85-C-8637 (N.D. Ill. June 19,
1987) (denied seller's motion to dismiss buyer's counterclaim of deceptive trade
practices); Omni-Circuits, Inc. v. DRP, Inc., No. 85-C-9081 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23,
1987) (implied warranty of fitness disclaimer challenged as inconspicuous; de-
fendant's summary judgment motion denied); Shapiro Budrow & Assoc. v.
Microdata Corp., No. 84-C-3589 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 1986) (buyer failed to show
breach of limited warranty); Sierra Diesel Injection Serv. v. Burroughs Corp.,
648 F. Supp. 1148 (D. Nev. 1986) (manufacturer denied summary judgment;
buyer claimed breach of contract, breach of warranty and fraud), reconsideration
denied, 651 F. Supp. 1371 (D. Nev. 1987); Darts Inv. Co. v. Wang Laboratories,
Inc., No. 85-C-0099 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 1985) (manufacturer's motion to dismiss
836 [Vol. 33: p. 835
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Consumers generally know less about computers than they know
granted, denying buyer's claims of breach of contract, breach of warranty, mis-
representation, unconscionability and inconspicuous warranty disclaimer);
United States Welding, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 587 F. Supp. 49 (D. Colo.
1984) (negligent misrepresentation claim not precluded by contract claims); Ac-
cuSystems, Inc. v. Honeywell Information Sys., 580 F. Supp. 474 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (purchaser recovered out-of-pocket losses under fraud theory); Comput-
erized Radiological Serv., Inc. v. Syntex Corp., 595 F. Supp. 1495, 1510
(E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 786 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1986) (contin-
ued use of defective CAT scanner by buyer precluded rescission based on revo-
cation of acceptance; remanded on fraud claim); Invacare Corp. v. Sperry Corp.,
612 F. Supp. 448 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (buyer's fraud claim precluded manufac-
turer's motion for summary judgment based on two-year contractual statute
of limitation); AMF, Inc. v. Computer Automation, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.
Ohio 1983) (summary judgment precluded for defendant because genuine is-
sues of material fact concerning fraud and failure of essential purpose of exclu-
sive remedy clause); Jaskey Fin. and Leasing v. Display Data Corp., 564 F. Supp.
160 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (warranty disclaimer effective, under Maryland law, against
all claims in, or sounding in, contract); Stone Supply Co. v. Minicomputer Sales
and Leasing, Inc., 2 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 9824 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 1983)
(seller's motion to dismiss denied despite contractual warranty disclaimer, limi-
tation of remedy and limitation of damages); Management Assistance, Inc. v.
Computer Dimensions, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 666 (N.D. Ga. 1982), aff'd sub nom.
Computer Dimensions v. Basic/Four Corp., 747 F.2d 708 (11 th Cir. 1984) (par-
tial summary judgment for seller on issue of fraud in inducement where buyer
had opportunity to inspect contract; no "good faith" claim available under
U.C.C.); Office Supply Co., Inc. v. Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.
Wis. 1982) (buyer denied recovery under breach of contract claim because dam-
age limitation not unconscionable and buyer aware of warranty disclaimer);
Bruffey Contracting Co., v. Burroughs Corp., 522 F. Supp. 769 (D. Md. 1981),
aff'd, 681 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1982) (buyer failed to show breach of limited war-
ranty; could not revoke acceptance or recover damages under Michigan law);
Garden State Food Distrib., Inc. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 512 F. Supp. 975 (D.N.J.
1981) (lessee recovered, for breach of express and implied warranties, charges
previously paid where lease limited liability and remedies); APLications, Inc. v.
Hewlett-Packard Co., 501 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (knowledgeable buyer
did not rely on seller's claims, summary judgment granted for seller in warranty
and misrepresentation action) aff'd, 672 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1982); Hi Neighbor
Enters., Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 492 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Fla. 1980) (partial sum-
mary judgment granted for manufacturer on punitive damages and breach of
contract issue where contract limited damages and disclaimed warranties; issue
of punitive damages based on fraud preserved); Chatlos Sys., v. National Cash
Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.J. 1979) (buyer awarded cover after
purchased computer system did not match warranted performance), rev'd as to
damages, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir.), aff'd, 670 F.2d 1304 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
457 U.S. 1112 (1982); Diversified Env'ts., Inc. v. Olivetti Corp. of Am., 461 F.
Supp. 286 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (lessee recovered lease payments with finance
charges, interest and accountant's fees for breach of contract); Badger Bearing
v. Burroughs Corp., 444 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (dismissed buyer's action
for breach of express and implied warranties and misrepresentation), aff'd with-
out opinion, 588 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1978); Teamsters Sec. Fund v. Sperry Rand
Corp., 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Bigelow) 951 (1976) (lessee recovered addi-
tional costs of equipment, labor and supplies for breach of contract); Honeywell
Information Sys., Inc. v. Demographic Sys., Inc., 396 F. Supp. 273 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (buyer under installment contract not entitled to assert poor computer
performance in replevin action by seller); Investors Premium Corp. v. Bur-
roughs Corp., 389 F. Supp. 39 (D.S.C. 1974) (warranty disclaimer effective
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against buyer's unsubstantiated breach of contract and tort claims); Carl Beasley
Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 361 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 493 F.2d
1400 (3d Cir. 1974) (buyer awarded purchase price and consequential damages
under breach of sale and service contract); Burroughs Corp. v. Hall Affiliates,
Inc., 423 So. 2d 1348 (Ala. 1982) (buyer recovered purchase price, but not puni-
tive damages, under fraud theory); Kalil Bottling Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 127
Ariz. 278, 619 P.2d 1055 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (judgment for manufacturer
under warranty disclaimer and parol evidence rule; remanded on issue of failure
of essential purpose of limited warranty); Acme Pump Co. v. National Cash Reg-
ister Corp., 32 Conn. Supp. 69, 337 A.2d 672 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1974) (pur-
chaser recovered purchase price under express and implied warranty theories);
Neilson Business Equip. Center, Inc. v. Monteleone, 524 A.2d 1172 (Del. 1987)
(lessee entitled to relief under breach of implied warranties; contract for hard-
ware and software is "good" under U.C.C.); Brown v. Techdata Corp., 238 Ga.
622, 234 S.E.2d 787 (1977) (buyer awarded punitive damages under fraud the-
ory); Burroughs Corp. v. Macon Rubber Co., 154 Ga. App. 322, 268 S.E.2d 374
(1980) (judgment for defendant-buyer on counterclaim for breach of implied
warranties); Quad County Distrib. Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 68 Ill. App. 3d 163,
385 N.E.2d 1108 (1979) (measure of damages for failed software was contract
price less market price at time of breach); Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Burroughs
Corp., 49 Ill. App. 3d 213, 365 N.E.2d 1285 (1977) (warranty and damage dis-
claimers neither inconspicuous nor unconscionable); Data Processing Serv., Inc.
v. L.H. Smith Oil Corp., 492 N.E.2d 314 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (computer
programmer denied recovery under breach of employment contract where pro-
gram failed to perform as warranted; computer programming not "good" under
U.C.C.); Cricket Alley Corp. v. Data Terminal Sys., Inc., 240 Kan. 661, 732 P.2d
719 (1987) (buyer recovered for breach of express warranty and increased costs
of labor); Atlas Indus., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 216 Kan. 213, 531
P.2d 41 (1975) (buyer recovered purchase price, less finance payments, from
manufacturer under express and implied warranty theories); Schatz Distrib. Co.,
Inc. v. Olivetti Corp. of Am., 7 Kan. App. 2d 676, 647 P.2d 820 (1982) (lessee
recovered for breach of warranty total value computer would have had had it
been delivered as warranted); Alexander v. Burroughs Corp., 350 So. 2d 988
(La. Ct. App. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 359 So. 2d 607 (La. 1978)
(plaintiff-buyer recovered finance charge and interest from date it demanded
cancellation under theory of significant defect); Burroughs Corp. v. Chesapeake
Petroleum and Supply Co., 282 Md. 406, 384 A.2d 734 (1978) (lessee awarded
damages for breach of express warranty); Lovely v. Burroughs Corp., 165 Mont.
209, 527 P.2d 557 (1974) (lessees recovered under breach of implied warranty
of fitness increased labor costs and losses incurred by sale of business adversely
affected by defective computer), appeal after remand, 169 Mont. 454, 548 P.2d 610
(1976); Burroughs Corp. v. Century Steel, Inc., 99 Nev. 464, 664 P.2d 354
(1983) (defendant-manufacturer in privity with third-party lessee and liable for
failure to install "workable" computer); Uniflex, Inc. v. Olivetti Corp. of Am., 86
A.D.2d 538, 445 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1982) (denied manufacturer's motion to dis-
miss); Rochester Welding Supply Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 78 A.D.2d 983, 433
N.Y.S.2d 888 (1980) (contractual two-year statute of limitation commences only
when buyer approves sale or seller/programmer concedes that it cannot prop-
erly program computer); Dumont Handkerchiefs, Inc. v. Nixdorf Computer,
Inc., 63 A.D.2d 618, 405 N.Y.S.2d 89 (1978) (systems house ordered to specifi-
cally perform turn-key computer contract), rev'd on other grounds, 69 A.D.2d 776,
415 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1979); All-States Leasing Co. v. Ochs, 42 Or. App. 319, 600
P.2d 899 (1979) (lessor is not necessarily merchant; defendant-purchasers' im-
plied warranties counterclaim withdrawn from jury); National Cash Register Co.
v. Modern Transfer Co., 224 Pa. Super. 138, 302 A.2d 486 (1973) (integration
clause precluded evidence of lessee's reliance on manufacturer's sales pitch);
Schepps Grocery Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 635 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982)
838
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about most other products.5 Consequently, they expect computer sales-
people to have precise knowledge of both the industry in general and
the particular equipment they sell. 6 Consumers tend to rely more heav-
(99.1% "up time" defeats failure of consideration claim); W.R. Weaver Co. v.
Burroughs Corp., 580 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979) (express contractual con-
ditions precluded summary judgment); Aubrey's R.V. Center, Inc. v. Tandy
Corp., 46 Wash. App. 595, 731 P.2d 1124 (1987) (buyer properly revoked ac-
ceptance of defective computer; awarded purchase price and finance charges).
Consequently, almost thirty percent of all computer vendors have become
involved in litigation, in some manner and at some time, arising out of the sale
of faulty systems.
5. Comment, Computer Malpractice. Are Computer Manufacturers, Service Bu-
reaus, and Programmers Really the Professionals They Claim to Be?, 23 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 1065, 1069 (1983) (some commentators refer to this as "mystique of the
computer").
One obstacle to understanding computers is the language used in the indus-
try. "Computerese" is exceedingly difficult to understand and it is interpreted
inconsistently throughout the industry. One journalist commented about his ig-
norance of computers and the recent broadcast of a computer commercial as
follows:
You may have seen this commercial on TV or heard it on the radio.
It is for Wang computers.
... One man quietly talks to another.
... What he says is something like this:
"I was giving a seminar on network management.., making SNA
work without IBM. Anyway, the room was filled with MIS guys . . .
[p]lus a VS computer at each node... .
And I'm sitting there . . . grinding my choppers because I don't
have the slightest idea what the heck this wise guy is talking about.
It's techno-babble.
Memo to a Haughty Computer Ad No Sale, The Pittsburgh Press, Nov. 5, 1987, at
B3, col. 2.
Judges are also confused by computer jargon. As the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia stated:
After hearing the evidence in this case the first finding the Court is con-
strained to make is that, in the computer age, lawyers and courts need
no longer feel ashamed or even sensitive about the charge, often made,
that they confuse the issue by resort to legal "jargon," law Latin or
Norman French. By comparison, the misnomers and industrial short-
hands of the computer world make the most esoteric legal writing seem
as clear and lucid as the Ten Commandments or the Gettysburg Ad-
dress; and to add to the Babel, the experts in the computer field, while
using exactly the same words, uniformly disagree as to precisely what
they mean.
Honeywell, Inc. v. Lithonia Lighting, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 406, 408 (N.D. Ga.
1970). See also Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737, 746
(2d Cir. 1979), aff'd after remand, 651 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1981).
6. Memo to a Haughty Computer Ad: No Sale, supra note 5, at B3, col. 2. Most
salespeople in the computer business are paid on the basis of salary and commis-
sion, salary and bonus, commission and bonus, or straight commission. Clearly
they have a vested interest in selling as many computers as they can. Thus, in
order to increase their percentages of sales quota achieved, salespeople tend to
overstate the capabilities of the products they sell. One commentator has even
5
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ily on statements, literature and other representations about computers
than they rely on representations about lower technology-products. 7
Over a period of time, a computer customer may become dependent
upon and place his confidence and trust in the computer seller.8 Conse-
quently, a relationship may develop in which the seller makes promises
to the buyer, but fulfills less than all of them. 9
This relationship provides an opportunity for the seller to place
"vaporware" with an unsuspecting consumer. Vaporware is a computer
product which, unknown to the purchaser, has not yet been created or
perfected.' 0 The sale of vaporware is not an uncommon occurrence;
some high technology companies depend upon sales revenues from un-
likened computer salespeople to used car salesmen: "they engage in puffery,
would rather not write things down, and may have end-of-the-fiscal-year inven-
tory hanging like Damoclean scimitars over their jobs." Comment, Damage
Awards and Computer Systems-Trends, 35 EMORY L.J. 255, 257 (1986).
7. Note, Frankly Incredible. Unconscionability in Computer Contracts, 4 CoM-
PUTER L.J. 695, 703 (1984).
8. Comment, supra note 5, at 1070. Due to the salesperson's and con-
sumer's disparate levels of computer expertise, reliance by the purchaser upon
the salesperson is usually reasonable. AccuSystems, Inc. v. Honeywell Informa-
tion Sys., Inc., 580 F. Supp. 474, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). See Wallace & Maher,
Commercial Unfairness and Economic Inefficiency as Exemplified by Unfair Risk Allocations
in Computer Contracts, 6 U. PIr. J. LAw & CoM. 59, 70 (1986); Note, supra note 7,
at 703.
9. See Comment, supra note 6, at 257.
10. The term "vaporware" cannot be found in any court opinion. How-
ever, it is submitted that the term describes the essence of computer cases in-
volving breach of contract, breach of warranty, misrepresentation and other
actions by the dissatisfied purchaser when he or she either fails to receive a
promised product since it has not been created or perfected, receives a product
which is DOA, or receives a product which is perfectly functional but does not
meet the purchaser's expectations.
Similarly, the term "vaporware" cannot be found in any secondary legal
sources. However, the legal problems posed by its manifestation have been ad-
dressed in a wide range of excellent books and articles. See, e.g., Conley, Software
Vendor Tort Liability, 13 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 23 (1987); Cronin, Con-
sumer Remedies for Defective Computer Software, 28 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMp. L.
273 (1985); Galler, Contracting Problems in the Computer Industry: Should Computer
Specialists Be Subjected to Malpractice Liability?, 50 INs. CouNs. J. 574 (1983);
Gemignani, Product Liability and Software, 8 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 173
(1981); Matek, Limiting Liability in Personal Computer Equipment Contracts, 88 COMM.
LJ. 562 (1983); Nycum, Liability for Malfunction of a Computer Program, 7 RUTGERS
J. COMPUTERS TECH. & L. 1 (1979); Saltzberg & Heffernan, Performance Claims in
the Sale of Computers, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 529 (1985); Scott, Negligence and
Related Tort Remedies for Hardware and Software Malfunctions, 1 COMPUTER L. &
PRAC. 166 (1985); Walker, Computer Litigation and the Manufacturer's Defenses Against
Fraud, 3 COMPUTER L.J. 427 (1982); Wallace & Maher, supra note 8; Comment,
supra note 6; Comment, supra, note 5; Comment, Computer Software and Strict Prod-
ucts Liability, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 439 (1983), Note, supra note 7; Note, Easing
Plaintiffs'Burden of Proving Negligence for Computer Malfunction, 69 IowA L. REV. 241
(1983); Note, Causes of Action in Computer Litigation: Special Problems for the Small or
First Time User, 14 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 327 (1983); Note, Negligence. Liabilityfor Defec-
tive Software, 33 OKLA. L. REV. 848 (1980); Note, The Warranty of Merchantability
and Computer Software Contracts: A Square Peg Won't Fit in a Round Hole, 59 WASH. L.
6
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perfected products to help pay for additional research and
development. " I
Such transactions inevitably promote dissatisfaction among pur-
chasers and provide the basis for lawsuits for breach of contract, breach
of warranty, failure of a warranty's essential purpose and more. These
contract theories are pleaded along with tort theories such as fraud, in-
tentional or negligent misrepresentation and product liability.' 2 Addi-
tionally, courts have considered, but have uniformly rejected, a new
cause of action entitled "computer malpractice,"'13 which would elimi-
nate reliance by courts on nebulous negligence standards.' 4
Computer liability cases are often factually complicated by standard
form contracts which limit remedies, provide warranty disclaimers and
invalidate prior representations. Recovery is further hindered by non-
quantifiable damages. 15 In addition, courts often misconstrue the facts
or the law, or both, and determine damages in an inconsistent man-
ner. 16 Furthermore, courts have not definitively resolved whether a
REV. 511 (1984); Note, Computer Contract Principles, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 105
(1986).
11. The author was a district manager for a major manufacturer of com-
puter printers and computers, and speaks from experience in this regard.
12. For an enumeration of lawsuits arising over computer sales, see supra
note 4.
13. See Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737 (2d
Cir. 1979), aff'd after remand 651 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1981); Chatlos Sys., Inc. v.
National Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.J. 1979), rev'd as to damages,
635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 670 F.2d 1304 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S.
1112 (1982).
Some computer purchasers have sought to establish computer malpractice
as a tort, thereby treating computer professionals like doctors, lawyers, and ar-
chitects, and to hold them to a higher standard of care than a negligence stan-
dard. Tanenbaum, User-Vendor Litigation from the User's Perspective, COMPUTER
LITIGATION 1984: RESOLVING COMPUTER RELATED DISPUTES AND PROTECTING
PROPRIETARY RIGHTS 475, 502-04 (1984). See also Comment, supra note 6, at
286-87; Comment, supra note 5, at 1066-93. For a discussion of computer mal-
practice, see infra notes 300-37.
14. The general standard of care subscribed to in negligence actions is that
of the "reasonable man of ordinary prudence." W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEE-
TON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 32, at 173 (5th ed. 1984).
The computer industry has relatively fewer standards by which to measure per-
formance than other industries have, and as such, the "reasonableness" stan-
dard is inapposite. Comment, supra note 5, at 1074.
15. See D. BRANDON & S. SEGELSTEIN, DATA PROCESSING CONTRACTS 6
(1976); Gordon & Starr, Software Development Contracts and Consulting Arrangements:
A Structure for Enforceability and Practicality, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 487, 488-89
(1985); Saltzberg & Heffernan, supra note 10, at 530-34; Wallace & Maher, supra
note 8, at 67-68.
16. See, e.g., AccuSystems, Inc. v. Honeywell Information Sys., Inc., 580 F.
Supp. 474, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (plaintiff entitled to all pecuniary losses but
must mitigate); Cricket Alley Corp. v. Data Terminal Sys., 240 Kan. 661, 669,
732 P.2d 719, 724 (1987) (damages include increased labor costs); Schatz Dis-
trib. Co. v. Olivetti Corp. of Am., 7 Kan. App. 2d 676, 647 P.2d 820 (1982)
(damages are difference between value of good delivered and as warranted).
19881
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contract for the purchase of computer software is a contract for "goods"
or for "services." 17
The multiplicity and complexity of legal issues raised by computers
and their essential technology reflect computers' uniquely pervasive im-
pact on society. However, the enormous legal impact of the computer is
disproportionate to the computer's young age. Because the computer
industry is emerging from its infancy and will undoubtedly play an even
larger role in the world economy of the future, the judiciary may find it
useful to establish practical and flexible standards for applying tort and
contract law to vaporware cases.
Despite periods of recession in other areas of the economy, the de-
mand for computers and related products in the United States has risen
at a steady and rapid rate since 1978.18 Consequently, the computer
industry has created some of the world's largest and most profitable cor-
porations. 19 The industry is therefore ever expanding, with new compa-
17. Compare Computer Servicenters, Inc. v. Beacon Mfg. Co., 328 F. Supp.
653 (D.S.C. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1971) (data processing contract
for performance of services) and Data Processing Serv., Inc. v. L.H. Smith Oil
Corp., 492 N.E.2d 314, 318-19 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (development of custom-
designed software is performance of services) with Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v.
Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737, 741 (2d Cir. 1979), aff'd after remand, 651 F.2d
132 (2d Cir. 1981) (sale of "turn-key" system, that is, computer equipment,
software and training, is sale of goods; services merely incidental) and RRX In-
dus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543, 546 (9th Cir. 1985) (development of
custom-designed software is sale of goods) and Neilson Business Equip. Center,
Inc. v. Monteleone, 524 A.2d 1172, 1174-75 (Del. 1987) (turn-key system is a
good).
18. The computer industry is one of the fastest growing sectors of the U.S.
economy. "Average annual growth rates for companies in this industry have
been 11.1% for the twenty-five year period ending in 1980." Rodau, Computer
Software: Does Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code Apply?, 35 EMORY L.J. 853,
853 n.3 (1986). Furthermore, the industry is expected to continue growing.
The number of computers purchased is expected to increase by a factor of ten
during the next decade. Id. Accordingly, in 1988, the ten largest United States
computer manufacturers collectively grossed approximately $90 billion in sales.
See infra note 19. Furthermore, U.S. manufacturers account for only a portion of
all computers sold within the U.S.
19. The top ten computer manufacturers in the United States are as
follows:
Company Sales ($ Millions) Employees
Int'l Business Machines 50,000 405,000
UNISYS 10,770 128,000
Digital Equip. Corp. 7,590 93,500
Honeywell 6,620 93,500
Litton Ind., Inc. 4,520 57,200
Nat'l Cash Register 4,310 62,000
Control Data Corp. 3,670 38,800
Wang Laboratories, Inc. 2,640 30,000
Harris Corp. 2,210 28,000
SCM 2,000 20,900
DUN AND BRADSTREET'S MILLION DOLLAR DIRECTORY (1987).
The top ten computer retailers in the United States are as follows:
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nies seeking to lure customers away from other established corporations
by introducing and marketing their "latest technology" products. 20
However, these latest technology products often are not delivered on
time to purchasers due to technological or economic obstacles. 2 1 More-
over, while significantly more products are delivered on schedule, they
often fail to meet purchasers' expectations due to either the puffery of
the salesperson or the purchasers' overly optimistic expectations.
II. BACKGROUND
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided
one of the earliest vaporware cases in Sperry Rand Corp. v. Industrial Supply
Corp.22 In Industrial Supply, a pre-Uniform Commercial Code case, an
industrial hardware distributor purchased a custom designed punch-
card computer system from Sperry, who represented the system as more
economical, faster and more efficient than the distributor's previous
computer system. 23 The sales contract provided a thirty-day warranty
for adjustments by Sperry and a ninety-day warranty for defective parts.
It also included a merger clause which excluded all prior representations
by Sperry about the system. 24
After several months, Industrial Supply expressed to Sperry its dis-
satisfaction with the computer system, repudiated the contract and
sought a refund of the system's purchase price.2 5 Sperry refused, sug-
Company Sales ($ Millions) Employees
Businessland 600 2,030
NYNEX 388 N/A
Beltron 300 N/A
PacTel 295 N/A
Computer Innovations 256 980
The Computer Factory 225 N/A
Egghead 170 N/A
Inacomp 145 634
CompuShop 120 366
MBI 116 578
Computer & Software News, Oct. 5, 1987, at 17.
20. See Rodau, supra note 18, at 853 n.4.
21. In the computer field, market timing is essential to sales because the
computer product often has a short life and may be quickly replaced by an im-
proved model. Management Sys. Assoc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 762 F.2d
1161, 1180 n.28 (4th Cir. 1985). Thus, once a product is near completion, or
still in the design stage, salespeople will often sell the product as though it cur-
rently exists and is operational.
22. 337 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1964).
23. Id. at 366.
24. Id. at 367.
25. Id. The facts of the case do not reveal Industrial Supply's actual reason
for repudiating the contract. Thus, it is unclear whether the problems exper-
ienced by Industrial Supply were due to a classic vaporware problem or to the
youth of the computer industry and Industrial Supply's naivete about com-
puters. One practitioner has suggested that such factually unclear cases are gen-
erally due to mere misunderstandings between parties, and as such, should not
9
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gesting that Industrial Supply's dissatisfaction was due to its own unwill-
ingness to properly accommodate the system. 26 Industrial Supply sued,
claiming breach of express and implied warranties as well as fraud, and
sought rescission of the contract. 2 7 Sperry defended by stating that the
system was delivered as warranted, and that any other representations
were merely opinions which had no legal impact upon the sale or were,
in any event, excluded from the sales agreement by the contract's
merger clause. 28
The Fifth Circuit found in favor of Industrial Supply, holding that
Sperry had breached the implied warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose.2 9 The court recognized Industrial Supply's inexperience with
computer systems, and overlooked its common law duty to inspect.
3 0
The court further held that neither the contract's merger clause nor the
parol evidence rule excluded the implied warranty of fitness.
3
'
In United States v. Wegematic Corp.,3 2 another early vaporware case,
the Federal Reserve Board (the Board) agreed to purchase Wegematic's
latest technology computer system. 33 The purchase order specified a
serve as precedent. Ellis, Contracting for Computer Equipment, Software and Services,
61 FLA. B.J. 29, 29 (1987).
26. 337 F.2d at 367. Sperry suggested that Industrial Supply's employees
found the transformation process so bothersome that they were simply unwilling
to change their established accounting systems. Id. Consequently, Sperry con-
tended that the suit was an attempt by Industrial Supply's management to pass
off additional costs imposed by their employees' dissention. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 369-70. The court held that the requirements for establishing
such a breach are: (1) the seller is possessed of a superior knowledge of the
articles sold; (2) the seller knows the particular purpose for which the articles are
required; (3) the buyer relies upon the skill and judgment of the seller; and
(4) the seller is aware of such reliance by the buyer. Id.
30. Id. at 370. The court stated:
Industrial Supply did not know and could not be expected to ascertain,
except by use and experiment, the functional abilities and capacities of
the electronic equipment, with its transistors, tubes and diodes, and its
varicolored maze of wiring, its buttons and switches, and the supple-
menting of machines and devices for the punching of cards and others
for the sorting thereof. And, of course, the personnel of Industrial
Supply could not be expected to understand the processes by which a
set of these modern miracle-makers perform their tasks.
Id.
It should be noted that very few risks can be identified and assessed by the
computer buyer before installation. Given the enormous complexity of hard-
ware and software, even the most meticulous preinstallation system testing by an
expert will overlook some defects. See Wallace & Maher, supra note 8, at 64 n. 17.
Furthermore, because programming and designing is a complex business, mis-
takes are an inevitable part of the manufacturing process. Shuey, Choosing Pro-
gramsfor the Firm, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 28, 1983, at 15, col. 3.
31. 337 F.2d at 370-71.
32. 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966).
33. Id. at 674-75. Wegematic, which was a newly-organized corporation,
[Vol. 33: p. 835844
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delivery date, liquidated damages and Wegematic's responsibility for ex-
cess costs incurred by the Board in the event Wegematic failed to com-
ply with any provision of the agreement. 34 Subsequently, delivery of the
advanced computer system proved to be impossible due to "basic engi-
neering difficulties." 3 5
Wegematic notified the Board that it would not deliver the system.
The Board exercised its right under the contract to replace the com-
puter by purchasing a similar system at a higher price.3 6 The Board
brought a breach of contract suit for the difference in price and liqui-
dated damages. Wegematic defended by arguing that it required an ad-
ditional two years and $1.5 million in order to correct the engineering
problem. Therefore, Wegematic contended, the "practical impossibil-
ity" of completing the contract excused its default.3 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided
in favor of the Board, holding that a manufacturer who represents his
product as a "revolutionary breakthrough" impliedly assumes the risk of
damages arising out of his breach.3 8 The court further reasoned that to
hold otherwise would permit an entrepreneurial developer "a wide de-
gree of latitude with respect to performance while holding an option to
compel the buyer to pay if the gamble should pan out."3 9
In these early vaporware cases the courts empathized with the na-
ivete of purchasers of high technology products and found in their
favor.40 These decisions occurred in a commercial environment where
represented that the computer was "a truly revolutionary system utilizing all of
the latest technical advances," and featured that "maintenance problems are
minimized by the use of highly reliable magnetic cores for not only the high
speed memory but also logical elements and registers." Id.
34. Id. The contract provided that "the Board may procure the services
described in the contract from other sources and hold the Contractor responsi-
ble for any excess cost occasioned thereby." Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. The Board bought a mainframe computer from IBM at a price
which exceeded Wegematic's bid proposal by approximately $190,000. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 676. Specifically, the court stated:
We see no basis for thinking that when an electronics system is pro-
moted by its manufacturer as a revolutionary breakthrough, the risk of
the revolution's [non-]occurrence falls on the purchaser; the reason-
able supposition is that it has already occurred or, at least, that the
manufacturer is assuring the purchaser that it will be found to have
when the machine is assembled.
Id.
39. Id. at 676-77. The court further stated that "[i]f a manufacturer wishes
to be relieved of the risk that what looks good on paper may not prove so good
in hardware, the appropriate exculpatory language is well known and often
used." Id.
40. By contrast, one commentator suggests that in the past, courts have
shown great deference to vendors in commercial sales disputes over failed in-
stallations, but as the need to protect an "infant industry" lessens, courts have
become less generous toward vendors and are currently finding their way
1988] COMMENT 845
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parties are generally presumed to deal at arm's length and to owe no
duties to each other except those that may be found within the four cor-
ners of the contract. 41
Although these vaporware cases have served as precedent for sub-
sequent lawsuits involving the sale of nonexistent or unperfected com-
puter products, 4 2 many courts have been less compassionate to
plaintiffs' claims. Courts have often ignored the unique context of cases
involving computers when applying traditional legal principles and have
mechanistically applied the law to such cases. This Comment will ex-
plore those other areas of the law which are apposite to vaporware cases,
and will suggest a general framework for resolving legal issues which
arise from the sale of defective computer systems.
III. ANALYSIS
Vaporware cases commonly involve general contract principles,43
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) issues, 44 damages, 45 and fraud and
misrepresentation claims.46 Additionally, "computer malpractice", a
proposed cause of action which has not yet been recognized by any
court, may soon become a valuable tool for resolving problems which
arise from the sale of defective computer systems.4 7
A. General Contract Principles
Vaporware cases often involve a "turn-key" computer system, that
is, a custom designed software and hardware system sold as a package
which is ready to perform a specialized function immediately upon deliv-
ery to the purchaser.48 Purveyors of turn-key systems are often referred
to as systems houses.4 9 Most systems houses provide custom software
around warranty and damage disclaimers that are the rule in computer industry
contracts. See Comment, supra note 6, at 255-58.
41. See, e.g., Consolidated Data Terminals v. Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc.,
708 F.2d 385, 392 n.6 (9th Cir. 1983) (unconscionability rarely exists in com-
mercial setting where parties have equal bargaining power); Earman Oil Co. v.
Burroughs Corp., 625 F.2d 1291, 1300 (5th Cir. 1980) (rebuttable presumption
that commercial contract is at arm's length). See also Comment, U.C.C. § 2-719 as
Applied to Computer Contracts-Unconscionable Exclusions of Remedy?: Chatlos Sys-
tems, Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 14 CONN. L. REV. 71, 98 (1981).
Contra Homing v. Sycom, 556 F. Supp. 819, 821 (E.D. Ky. 1983) (solo medical
practitioner successfully avoided contract).
42. See infra notes 62-337 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 48-99 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 100-241 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 272-299 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 240-271 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 300-337 and accompanying text.
48. Neilson Business Equip. Center, Inc. v. Monteleone, 524 A.2d 1172,
1174-75 (Del. 1987).
49. See Bender, supra note 2, at 410. Sellers of turn-key systems are also
referred to in the computer industry as Value Added Resellers (VARs), that is,
12
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to meet the specifications of their clients. 50 In the typical computer con-
tract case, the plaintiff is a small business which purchases a turn-key
system under a written agreement from a larger systems house.51
In a turn-key sales contract, the purchaser will typically attempt to
define in advance the software's structure and the hardware's specifica-
tions. However, the system's final form can usually be determined only
after the contract has been signed and the seller has had an opportunity
to determine whether its programming abilities can satisfy the pur-
chaser's needs. Consequently, this conflict creates a "catch-22" situa-
tion for turn-key system purchasers. 52
Contracts for turn-key systems often necessitate the services of in-
dependent programmers and consultants. 53 In such cases, the systems
house will attempt to contract with the purchaser for a finished product
that conforms to the user's specifications. 5 4 The user, on the other
hand, will attempt to contract for a completely "bug free" system. 55
This tension generally results in contractual vagueness, a common fea-
ture of development and consulting contracts.5 6 The contract will
vaguely state the expected nature of the finished product and the esti-
mated man-hours necessary to complete the product.
5 7
Three provisions are commonly found in standardized computer
equipment sales contracts: 1) the manufacturer's warranty against de-
fects in material and workmanship for some period of time; 2) the manu-
facturer's disclaimer of all other warranties, express and implied,
including, but not limited to, the implied warranties of merchantability
and fitness for a particular purpose; and 3) a merger clause which pro-
computer dealers who specialize in custom designing computer hardware and
software systems for end users. Computer & Software News, Oct. 5, 1987, at 12,
col. 1. In the U.S., VARs account for a huge amount of computer hardware and
software sales and consulting. Id. A 1984 study by Mini-Micro Systems estimated
the sales of micros and minis through VARs at over $50 billion. Another study,
by Digital Equipment, projected an $111 billion market among first-time users
in special applications markets alone from 1984 to 1990. Id. Thus, VAR busi-
ness is big and is growing at well over fifty percent per year. Id.
50. See Bender, supra note 2, at 410.
51. Saltzberg & Heffernan, supra note 10, at 530.
52. Gordon & Starr, supra note 15, at 488. This is a "catch-22" because one
cannot accurately and completely detail the definition of a software program that
has not yet been created. Id. at 488 n.2. Since hardware is becoming consist-
ently more reliable, it should be noted that, unlike the first lawsuits involving
computers, the bulk of future litigation is likely to focus more on software and
less on hardware. Zammit, Computer Software and the Law, 68 A.B.A. J. 970, 970-
71 (1982). The primary legal concern in the future will be related to software,
particularly custom designed software. Id.
53. Adam, Gordon & Starr, Contractual, Financial, and Tax Issues in Major
Procurements, 4 COMPUrER L.J. 465, 487-96 (1984).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See Gordon & Starr, supra note 15, at 488-89.
57. Id.
1988]
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vides that the written agreement constitutes the entire agreement be-
tween the purchaser and purveyor, and that the written agreement
supersedes all prior communications between the parties, including all
oral and written proposals.5 8 However, these contractual limitations of
liability are generally not effective against claims for negligence 5 9 or
fraud.
The standardized contract is an important mechanism for allocating
risk. 60 If a risk cannot be identified and assessed in advance, the use of a
limitation of liability provision in a standardized contract provides a con-
venient means of allocating such contingent risk in advance. 6 1 The ef-
fect of these standard computer contracts provisions under traditional
contract principles is distinctive in several respects and is discussed
below.
1. Parol Evidence Rule
Courts have in some vaporware cases given full effect to contractual
merger clauses and as a result have precluded plaintiffs' claims. For ex-
ample, in Office Supply Co. v. Basic/Four Corp.,62 the United States District
58. See Saltzberg & Heffernan, supra note 10, at 534; see also Hunter v. Texas
Instruments, Inc., 798 F.2d 299, 301 n.5 (8th Cir. 1986); Consolidated Data Ter-
minals v. Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc., 708 F.2d 385, 391 n.5 (9th Cir. 1983);
Earman Oil Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 625 F.2d 1291, 1294 nn.6-8 (5th Cir. 1980);
AMF, Inc. v. Computer Automation, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 924, 927 (S.D. Ohio
1983); Office Supply Co. v. Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776, 778-79 (E.D.
Wis. 1982); Honeywell Information Sys., Inc. v. Demographic Sys., Inc., 396 F.
Supp. 273, 275 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Kalil Bottling Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 127
Ariz. 278, 280, 619 P.2d 1055, 1056-57 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); Comment, supra
note 6, at 259.
The collective effect of these three clauses has often been to eliminate al-
most any chance of a successful claim for breach of express or implied warran-
ties. See Saltzberg & Heffernan, supra note 10 at 534. The first provision is a
minimal warranty. Id. The second and third provisions exclude warranties as to
the performance or capacity of the computer system. Id. Moreover, the third
clause, a "merger" or "integration" clause, employs the parol evidence rule to
exclude sales literature or sales talk that might otherwise be found to create an
express warranty. Id. Such clauses have, in some cases, been held to shield
computer vendors entirely from liability for breach of warranty when computer
systems do not work as the consumer expected. Id.
59. See Gordon & Starr, supra note 15, at 512 n.56.
60. See Wallace & Maher, supra note 8, at 67-68.
61. Id. The standardized contract thereby generates considerable social
benefits as well as onerous problems. Id. A standardized contract amounts to
private legislation imposed by the computer industry without negotiated input
from buyers who will also be governed by it; thus, it is illusory to maintain that,
in such cases, freedom of contract exits. Id.
62. 538 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Wis. 1982). After two months of comparison
shopping, Office Supply Company, Inc. (Office Supply), entered into a contract
with Basic/Four Corporation (Basic/Four) for the purchase of computer hard-
ware and the lease of accounting software. Id. at 778. The sales agreement pro-
vided a 90-day warranty against defects in material, workmanship, and operating
failure from ordinary use, limited Office Supply's remedy to free repair by Ba-
14
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Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin held that a computer sales
contract which specifically provides that it constitutes the entire agree-
ment and understanding between the parties through an integration
clause prevents consideration of parol evidence to vary the terms of the
agreement.6 3 The plaintiff was, therefore, precluded from suing under
a breach of contract or warranty theory.64
The Arizona Court of Appeals applied the same contractual princi-
ple to fraud and misrepresentation claims in Kalil Bottling Co. v. Burroughs
Corp.65 In Kalil the court held that, because the contract specifically ex-
sic/Four, excluded Basic/Four's liability for loss of profits and incidental and
consequential damages, disclaimed all express and implied warranties in lower-
case italicized lettering, and excluded all prior agreements. Id. After the com-
puter equipment was installed, Office Supply sent a letter to Basic/Four inform-
ing the latter that the software appeared to be satisfactory. Id. Office Supply
discovered shortly thereafter that the software did not, in fact, work satisfacto-
rily. Id. Basic/Four worked with Office Supply to correct the "bugs" for several
months, and continued to do work beyond the warranty period. Id. Yet, the
software was not perfected until after three years and additional expenditures by
Office Supply. Id. Office Supply brought suit against Basic/Four, claiming
breach of contract, breach of express and implied warranties, failure of limited
warranty's essential purpose, and negligence in manufacture, design, installa-
tion, and repair. Id. at 778-79. The court granted Basic/Four's motion for sum-
mary judgment on all these claims. Id. at 793.
63. Id. at 782 (citing APLications, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 501 F. Supp.
129 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), a"ffd, 672 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1982)). The court based its
holding on the fundamental principle that contractual language must be inter-
preted in an effort to determine the intent of the contracting parties. Id. at 782.
The Uniform Commercial Code parol evidence rule provides:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the
parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by
the parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such
terms as are included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of
any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may
be explained or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or
by course of performance (Section 2-208); and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the
court finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete and
exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.
U.C.C. § 2-202 (1978).
64. 538 F. Supp. at 786.
65. 127 Ariz. 278, 619 P.2d 1055 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980). The Kalil Bottling
Company (Kalil) replaced its previous computer system with a computer from
Burroughs Corporation (Burroughs) through a third-party lease/purchase
agreement. Id. at 279, 619 P.2d at 1056. The sales agreement warranted against
defects in material and workmanship for one year, waived all damages, negated
all prior representations, excluded implied warranties of merchantability and fit-
ness for a particular purpose, expressly extended all guarantees and warranties
to Kalil, and limited all remedies to repair or replacement. Id. at 279-80, 619
P.2d at 1056-57. The system frequently "crashed," causing a backlog at Kalil.
Id. Kalil brought suit against Burroughs, claiming breach of contract, breach of
express warranty, breach of implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for
a particular purpose, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and consumer fraud.
Id. at 280, 619 P.2d at 1057.
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cluded the alleged misrepresentations, Kalil's claims for negligent mis-
representation, fraud and consumer fraud could not be proved by
extrinsic evidence under the parol evidence rule. 66
In contrast, the United States District Court for the District of Ne-
vada held in Sierra Diesel Injection Service v. Burroughs Corp.,6 7 that the pa-
rol evidence rule does not exclude evidence of fraud in the inducement
of a contract, even where the court finds that there is an integrated
agreement. 68 Rather, the court held that parol evidence may always be
used to show fraud in the inducement of the contract, even if there has
been a valid integration, because fraud in the inducement invalidates the
entire contract. 6 9
Although the plaintiffs in Office Supply, Kalil and Sierra were each
commercial entities-that purchased similar computer systems, the courts
interpreted the relationship between the parol evidence rule and merger
clauses differently. It is submitted that Office Supply and Sierra offer better
reasoned holdings. As the court in Office Supply held, a contract should
be capable of precluding certain causes of action. 70 However, as the
Sierra court intimated, a cause of action for fraud or misrepresentation
attacks the validity of the contract as a whole. Precluding such claims
based on the parol evidence rule would beg the question whether an
enforceable contract existed at all.7 '
66. Id. at 282, 619 P.2d at 1058.
67. 648 F. Supp. 1148 (D. Nev. 1986), reconsideration denied, 651 F. Supp.
1371 (D. Nev. 1987). Sierra Diesel Injection Service (Sierra) contracted with
Burroughs Corp., Inc. (Burroughs), for the purchase of a computer hardware
and software "multi-program" system which would administer Sierra's billing
and accounts receivable tasks. 648 F. Supp. at 1149. Burroughs represented
that one of its computer models could handle the requirements of Sierra's busi-
ness, and installed the system shortly thereafter. Id. Subsequently, the system
proved to be inadequate for Sierra's needs, and after four years of attempting to
resolve the problem, Burroughs replaced the system with a more advanced
model. Id. The advanced model proved to be insufficient as well. Id. Sierra
brought suit against Burroughs after an additional three years for, among other
claims, fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of contract and warranty. Id.
68. 651 F. Supp. at 1377.
69. Id. The court stated: "authorities hold that merger clauses ... are
strong evidence of integration, but that they are not necessarily conclusive [that
the writings are the final expression of the parties' agreement]." Id. at 1376.
70. 538 F. Supp. at 782. This proposition is inapplicable where the provi-
sion in question is determined to be unconscionable. For a discussion of uncon-
scionability, see infra notes 219-239 and accompanying text.
71. 651 F. Supp. at 1377. In order to avoid problems with the relationship
between the parol evidence rule and contractual integration clauses, parties to a
computer contract should particularize terms of payment, delivery, acceptance,
respective responsibilities of purveyors and programmers, "force majeure"
terms, software capabilities, hardware capacities, and much more. See Ellis, supra
note 25, at 29-30; Gordon & Starr, supra note 15, at 489-97. Because consumers
are in general becoming progressively more knowledgeable about computers,
and because computer hardware and software development is currently more of
a science and less of an art, parties to computer contracts can more easily specify
with greater detail the terms of the contract. See Ellis, supra note 25, at 29. Fur-
850 [Vol. 33: p. 835
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2. Lease Agreements and Contractual Rights and Duties
Although the U.C.C. did not recognize leases until recently,7 2
courts have historically applied sales contract principles to computer
leases. For example, in Neilson Business Equipment Center, Inc. v. Montele-
one,73 the Delaware Supreme Court held that, although computer agree-
ments are often structured as leases, the substance of such transactions
are properly characterized as sales.74 Additionally, in Office Supply,7 5 the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin held
that a sale of software which is in lease form for reasons related to copy-
right protection is nonetheless a "sale" for purposes of the U.C.C. 76
Finally, in Earman Oil Co. v. Burroughs Corp.,77 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that because a three-party
lease transaction was a financing arrangement, the real economic effect
of the transaction was a sale directly from Burroughs to Earman under
the "contemporaneous transaction" principle. 78 Under this doctrine,
thermore, the more detailed and precise a computer goods or services contract
is, the better the contract will serve the needs of both the vendor and the user.
See Gordon & Starr, supra note 15, at 488-89.
72. See U.C.C. § 2A (1987)(U.C.C. applies to leases).
U.C.C. § 2-102 (1978) states in pertinent part: "Unless the context other-
wise requires, this Article applies to transactions in goods; it does not apply to
any transaction which although in the form of an unconditional contract to sell
or present sale is intended to operate only as a security transaction .... Id.
(emphasis added).
73. 524 A.2d 1172 (Del. 1987). The plaintiff's office assistant, who had no
prior experience with computers, obtained through a lease/purchase agreement
a custom designed computer system from Neilson Business Equipment Center
(Neilson). Id. at 1172-74. Although Neilson did not design the software, it
purchased a suitable software program which it tailored to meet Dr. Montele-
one's particular business needs, and renamed it "Neilson Medical Office Man-
agement System." Id. The system subsequently failed to satisfy all of Dr.
Monteleone's billing and accounting needs. Id. After eight months of debug-
ging attempts, Neilson successfully effected modifications. Id. Nonetheless, Dr.
Monteleone brought suit against Neilson, claiming breach of warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. Id.
74. Id. at 1175 (citing Earman Oil Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 625 F.2d 1291,
1293 n.5 (5th Cir. 1980)).
75. For a discussion of the facts and holding in Office Supply, see supra note
62.
76. 538 F. Supp. at 778 n.1.
77. 625 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1980). In Earman, Earman Oil Company
(Earman) leased a computer system from National Equipment Rental (NER),
which had been sold to NER by Burroughs Corporation (Burroughs) after
Earman had carefully negotiated the terms of the sale with Burroughs. Id. at
1294. The lease form contained the standard computer contract provisions. Id.
at 1294 nn.6-7. Immediately after the computer was installed, it failed. Id. at
1293. Burroughs unsuccessfully attempted to remedy the problems over a
course of two years. Id. Earman brought an action against Burroughs for
breach of oral express warranties, implied warranty of merchantability, implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, and tortious misrepresentation of
the computer's capabilities. Id.
78. Id. at 1297.
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where a purchase agreement and a financing agreement "are executed
by the same parties at or near the same time in the course of the same
transaction and concern the same subject matter they will be read and
construed together," even though the separate documents may have
been executed days or weeks apart. 79
A computer lease may, therefore, be legally similar to a computer
purchase insofar as the same rights and duties may arise under both
transactions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
applied this analogy in Hunter v. Texas Instruments, Inc.80 In Hunter, the
court held that a manufacturer's liability for breach of warranty may be
limited or excluded in a distributor's lease even though the manufac-
turer is not a party to the contract. 81 Thus, a party to a computer lease
agreement cannot claim that its terms are per se invalid.
3. The Relationship Between Express Warranties and Warranty Exclusions
In some instances, warranties which are expressly included in a writ-
ten sales contract are excluded by other contractual provisions. For ex-
ample, a vendor may contractually exclude implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, and in the same
writing warrant against defects in material and workmanship. The legal
result of this contradiction is unclear, giving rise to several possible
consequences.
Perhaps these provisions directly conflict and, therefore, vitiate
each other. Alternatively, each provision may pertain to unrelated char-
acteristics of the product. Finally, perhaps a product must be free of
defects in material and workmanship in order to be merchantable. The
following cases illustrate the current relationship between express war-
ranties and warranty exclusions.
In Nixdorf Computer, Inc. v. Jet Forwarding, Inc.,8 2 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied the fundamental princi-
ple that if uncertainty exists about the meaning of contractual provi-
sions, the language of the contract is to be construed most strongly
against the drafter of the ambiguous term.8 3 Moreover, in W.R. Weaver
79. Id. (quoting Atlas Indus., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 216 Kan.
213, 220, 531 P.2d 41, 46-47 (1975)).
80. 798 F.2d 299 (8th Cir. 1986) (3-0 decision). Luther A. Hunter (Hunter)
purchased a Texas Instruments, Inc. (TI) computer through a third-party fi-
nance company whose lease limited the lessee's available remedies and the man-
ufacturer's liabilities. Id. at 300. Despite thirteen attempts by TI to fix the
computer's "bugs," the system proved to be defective. Id. Hunter brought suit
against TI claiming breach of express and implied warranties, and seeking con-
sequential and incidental damages, including lost profits. Id. Hunter argued
that TI's warranty disclaimer failed because it was unconscionable and incon-
spicuous, and TI's limitation of remedies was unconscionable. Id. at 301.
81. Id. at 302.
82. 579 F.2d 1175 (9th Cir. 1978).
83. Id. at 1178 (construing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1654 (Deering 1973)).
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COMMENT
v. Burroughs Corp.,84 the Texas Court of Appeals held that any ambiguity
arising from the combined effect of an express warranty and a warranty
exclusion will be resolved in favor of the express warranty. 85
This principle was later applied to a computer vaporware case in
Consolidated Data Terminals v. Applied Digital Data Systems, Inc.86 In Consoli-
dated Data, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that a general liability contractual disclaimer did not override the
highly particularized warranty created by specifications. 87 Thus, if a
contract includes both specific warranty language and a general dis-
claimer of warranties and the two cannot be reasonably reconciled, the
specific warranty prevails over the general disclaimer and properly
forms the basis for a breach of warranty action. 88
This principle was invoked by the Office Supply court, 89 which ex-
tended coverage to software under an express warranty that covered
hardware, but did not expressly cover software. 90 The court thereby
84. 580 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979). W.R. Weaver Company (Weaver)
agreed to lease computer hardware and purchase custom designed accounting
software from Burroughs. Id. at 78. Among the terms and conditions of Bur-
roughs' standard sales contract was the following additional provision: "Bur-
roughs believes the programming being furnished hereunder is accurate and
reliable and when programming accomplishes initially agreed-upon results, such
programming will be considered completed." Id. In a separate written state-
ment, Burroughs provided that the "software... will be operable prior to instal-
lation." Id. Burroughs assigned the lease to a third-party leasing company and,
although Weaver made periodic lease payments for several years after installa-
tion, the software did not perform as agreed upon. Id. at 79. Consequently,
Weaver brought suit against Burroughs, claiming breach of express warranty,
breach of implied warranties of fitness and merchantability, and strict liability,
seeking incidental and consequential damages including treble damages and at-
torney's fees. Id. Burroughs argued that the statute of limitations had run, and
that all implied warranties and direct, incidental and consequential damages had
been contractually waived. Id.
85. Id. at 81.
86. 708 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1983). Applied Digital Data Systems, Inc.
(ADDS), a computer terminal manufacturer, entered into a non-exclusive re-
quirements contract with Consolidated Data Terminals (CDT), a distributor of
computer terminals. Id. at 388. In the course of their dealings, CDT distrib-
uted, among its other products, many units of ADDS's newest and supposedly
most advanced terminals, the Regent 100, which, according to ADDS's litera-
ture, would operate at a lightning fast speed of 19,200 "baud," that is, they
would display approximately 2700 characters per second on the terminal screen,
thereby "filling" or "refreshing" the screen in less than one second. Id. In fact,
none of the Regent 100s attained this speed-they functioned, on the average,
at one-tenth of the speed-and many were totally inoperative. Id. at 389. CDT
brought action against ADDS for fraud and negligence in its design, manufac-
ture, and sale of the defective terminals. Id. ADDS counterclaimed for moneys
owed to it for past transactions. Id.
87. Id. at 391 (construing U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (1978)).
88. Id. at 391-92.
89. For a discussion of the facts and holding in Office Supply, see supra note
62.
90. 538 F. Supp. at 783.
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expanded the terms of the express warranty and constricted the scope of
the warranty exclusion to allow warranty coverage which had not been
bargained for by the parties. 9 '
Based on these cases it appears that when express warranties and
warranty exclusions conflict, courts will nullify the warranty exclusions
and apply the express warranty. Alternatively, courts will include associ-
ated products under the terms of the express warranty and preclude ap-
plication of the warranty disclaimer to them.
4. Application of Express Warranties and Conditions
Although courts liberally interpret express warranties when they
conflict with contractual warranty disclaimers, 92 they apply them quite
literally when express warranties and conditions stand alone. For exam-
ple, in RRX Industries, Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc.,93 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that, despite efforts by a computer
vendor to "timely install an operational software system, to repair mal-
functions, and to train RRX employees, ' 94 the vendor nonetheless
breached its duties because the software did not function properly.9 5
The court interpreted this failure as a reflection of the vendor's concur-
rent failure to adequately correct programming errors and to provide
the purchaser's employees with sufficient training.9 6
In Honeywell Information Systems, Inc. v. Demographic Systems, Inc.,9 7 the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York inter-
preted the payment terms of a computer sales agreement so literally that
it found that the purchaser's payment was not conditioned upon per-
formance by the vendor.98 The court stated: "[E]ven taking defend-
91. Id.
92. For a discussion of interpretations of express warranties, see supra notes
77-85 and accompanying text.
93. 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985). RRX Industries, Inc. (RRX), and Lab-
Con, Inc. (Lab-Con, successor to TEKA), entered into an agreement in which
Lab-Con would develop software for use in RRX's laboratories. Id. at 545. The
agreement obligated Lab-Con to correct any "bugs" in the software, and limited
Lab-Con's liability to the contract price. Id. The software proved to contain
irreparable bugs. Id. RRX stopped payment under the contract, and brought an
action for breach of contract and fraud against Lab-Con. Id. The district court
awarded RRX the purchase price and consequential damages. Id.
94. Id. at 546.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 396 F. Supp. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Demographic Systems, Inc. (DSI),
obtained a computer through an installment sales agreement from Honeywell
Information Systems, Inc. (Honeywell). Id. at 276. The contract provided a war-
ranty against defects in materials and workmanship, limited DSI's remedy to re-
pair or replacement, and excluded all other warranties and representations. Id.
at 275-76 n.l. Due to a long delay in installation of the complete system, DSI
ceased its payments to Honeywell. Id. at 275. Honeywell brought suit against
DSI for replevin and to recover the full value of DSI's promissory note. Id.
98. Id.
854 [Vol. 33: p. 835
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ant's allegations of poor equipment performance as true, defendant fails
to state a valid defense to a replevin claim where, as here, performance
was not a condition of payment under the Agreements." 9 9
It is submitted that courts will interpret uncontradicted contractual
provisions in a very literal manner. Perhaps this is an attempt to con-
strue ambiguous form contracts in a consistent manner. However, lit-
eral interpretation of computer purchase agreements can sometimes
have an unfair and disastrous effect upon the purchaser.
B. Computer Contracts Under the U. C. C.
Courts usually apply Article 2 of the U.C.C. to computer transac-
tions which involve hardware. ' 0 0 In the process of determining whether
the U.C.C. applies, however, courts have become involved in a lengthy
analysis to determine whether software and hardware systems constitute
"goods." Once it has been determined that they are goods and, there-
fore, the U.C.C. applies, courts have looked at the issues of conspicuous-
ness 'of warranty exclusions, limitations of damages and remedies,
implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular pur-
pose, failure of a warranty's essential purpose, unconscionability and
other U.C.C. principles.
99. Id.
100. Compare RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir.
1985) (software system is good; U.C.C. applies) and Triangle Underwriters, Inc.
v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979), aff'd after remand, 651 F.2d 132
(2d Cir. 1981) and AMF, Inc. v. Computer Automation, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 924,
930 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (U.C.C. applies) and APLications, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard
Co., 501 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 672 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1982)
(U.C.C. applies) and Office Supply Co., Inc. v. Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp.
776, 783-84 (E.D. Wis. 1982) (U.C.C. applies) and Chatlos Sys. v. National Cash
Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.J. 1979), aff'd and remanded, 635 F.2d
1081 (3d Cir.), aft'd, 670 F.2d 1304 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1112
(1982) (U.C.C. applies) and Badger Bearing v. Burroughs Corp., 444 F. Supp.
919 (E.D. Wis. 1977), aff'd without opinion, 588 lt.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1978) (U.C.C.
applies) and Neilson Business Equip. Center, In;. v. Monteleone, 524 A.2d 1172
(Del. 1987) and W.R. Weaver Co. v. Burroughs torp., 580 S.W.2d 76, 80 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1979) (U.C.C. applies) with Computer Servicenters, Inc. v. Beacon Mfg.
Co., 328 F. Supp. 653, (D.S.C. 1970), aft'd, 443 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1971) (sale of
custom designed software was rendering of services; U.C.C. inapplicable) and
Data Processing Serv., Inc. v. L.H. Smith Oil Corp., 492 N.E.2d 314, 318-19
(Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (sale of custom designed software was service).
See Comment, supra note 6, at 261. See also Gordon & Starr, supra note 15, at
525-26 (U.C.C. applies to hardware and software systems; but courts still unde-
cided whether U.C.C. applies to software alone). One commentator suggests
that "[t]he very conceptual base of the UCC, barely two decades old, is already
inappropriate for the information economy." Davidson, Common Law, Uncommon
Software, 47 U. PITr. L. REv. 1037, 1052-53 (1986) (citing U.C.C. §§ 2-314, -315
& -608 (1978)). "If the program is no more than a set of ideas, a contract to sell
a program is a service contract and therefore is not covered by article 2." Note,
Computer Programs as Goods Under the U.C.C., 77 MIcH. L. REV. 1149, 1150 (1979).
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1. Software Constitutes a "Good"
The U.C.C., Article 2, applies exclusively to "transactions in
goods."'' "Goods," as defined by the U.C.C., are "all things (includ-
ing specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of
identification to the contract for sale .... -102 Arguably, turn-key
software may be a specially manufactured good; 10 3 however, it is unclear
whether software is "movable."' 0 4 Furthermore, the phrase "time of
identification" is particularly ambiguous in the context of custom
designed software, for such software is often delivered before it is com-
pletely "debugged."1 0 5
However, identification can be made "at any time and in any man-
ner explicitly agreed to by the parties." ' 06 Moreover, identification may
be tentative or contingent by agreement,' 0 7 and there is no requirement
under the U.C.C. that the goods be in a deliverable state at the time of
101. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1978). The U.C.C. specifically states:
Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article applies to trans-
actions in goods; it does not apply to any transaction which although in
the form of an unconditional contract to sell or present sale is intended
to operate only as a security transaction nor does this Article impair or
repeal any statute regulating sales to consumers, farmers or other spec-
ified classes of buyers.
Id. (emphasis added).
102. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (1978).
103. See Note, supra note 100, at 1151.
104. Note, supra note 100, at 1152-53. "Program copies are 'movable' in
any of their three principal forms: software, memory devices, or data transmis-
sions." Id. at 1152.
105. See Davidson, supra note 100, at 1051-52 (identification is illusory con-
cept in computer context). See also Note, supra note 100, at 1155 (software is
analogous to records which are both movable and identifiable). It should be
noted that most custom designed and packaged software is sold and accepted
commercially with a number of "bugs" in it. See Davidson, supra note 100, at
1052-53. It is unclear whether software in this state is nevertheless "merchanta-
ble." Id.
106. U.C.C. § 2-501 (1978). The U.C.C. further states:
In the absence of explicit agreement identification occurs
(a) when the contract is made if it is for the sale of goods already
existing and identified;
(b) if the contract is for the sale of future goods.., when goods
are shipped, marked or otherwise designated by the seller as goods to
which the contract refers ....
Id.
Thus, custom designed software can be treated as a future good, and the
U.C.C. would, therefore, apply.
107. U.C.C. § 2-501 comment 2 (1978). The U.C.C. specifically states:
In the ordinary case identification of particular existing goods as
goods to which the contract refers is unambiguous and may occur in
one of many ways. It is possible, however, for the identification to be
tentative or contingent. In view of the limited effect given to identifica-
tion by this Article, the general policy is to resolve all doubts in favor of
identification.
Id. One commentator suggests that this confusion may be due to the varying use
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identification.1 08 Because the U.C.C. takes a broad approach to the
term "goods," it is probably the case that computer software falls within
its domain.
Patent attorneys have, for over twenty years, wrestled with the issue
whether software is sufficiently "tangible" to enable it to be covered by
the Patent Act. 10 9 The Patent Act provides that a patent may be ob-
tained on any useful, new and nonobvious "process, machine, manufac-
ture, composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof."" 10 This section of the Patent Act is sufficiently ambiguous that
courts have made inconsistent determinations of software patentability.
In Diamond v. Diehr I I I the United States Supreme Court enunciated
the definitive rule that one must first determine whether a mathematical
algorithm is directly or indirectly recited in the claim, and if so, deter-
mine whether the claim merely recites a mathematical algorithm."t 2 "If
the answers to both questions are in the affirmative, the claim is non-
statutory; otherwise it is statutory."' 13 In the software context, the rule
embodied in In re Abele" l4 is that a computer program is not merely an
algorithm, and is therefore patentable, if it is applied in any manner to
physical elements-such as a particular type of computer-or process
steps.' 15
The Copyright Act (the Act) recognizes the statutory problems
posed by computer software."l 6 The Act also explicitly recognizes com-
of terminology within the computer industry itself. See Rodau, supra note 18, at
861-62 & nn.30-31.
108. U.C.C. § 2-501 comment 4 (1978). The U.C.C. commentary specifi-
cally states:
In view of the limited function of identification there is no require-
ment in this section that the goods be in deliverable state or that all of
the seller's duties with respect to the processing of the goods be com-
pleted in order that identification occur. For example, despite identifi-
cation the risk of loss remains on the seller under the risk of loss
provisions until completion of his duties as to the goods and all of his
remedies remain dependent upon his not defaulting under the
contract.
Id. See also Gordon & Starr, supra note 15, at 526.
109. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-376 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
110. Id. § 101 (1982).
111. 450 U.S. 175 (1981); see also Matter of Application of Bradley, 600 F.2d
807, 813 (9th Cir. 1979).
112. See Bender, supra note 2, at 414-15.
113. Id. at 415.
114. 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
115. Id. at 908. See also Bender, supra note 2, at 416.
116. 17 U.S.C. § 101-914 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). With respect to its gen-
eral scope, the Copyright Act provides in pertinent part: "Copyright protection
subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device." Id. § 102(a). The earliest attempts to pro-
tect software successfully relied on trade secret law. See Rodau, supra note 18, at
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puter software as a "tangible medium of expression" in a recent amend-
ment to the Act, and bestows exclusive rights upon owners of computer
programs."1 7 Insofar as all computer programs fall into the domain of
the Act and some computer programs combined with computer hard-
ware fall into the domain of the Patent Act, it is submitted that the
U.C.C.'s broad definition of "goods" should implicitly include computer
software as well." 18 Courts almost unanimously share this sentiment.
854-55 n.6; Bender, Trade Secret Protection of Software, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 909
(1970).
117. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982). The Act specifically provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringe-
ment for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or au-
thorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer
program provided:
(1) that such new copy or adaptation is created as an essential
step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a
machine and that it is used in no other manner, or
(2) that such a new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes
only and that all archival copies are destroyed in the event that contin-
ued possession of the computer program should cease to be rightful.
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this
section may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the
copy from which such copies were prepared, only as part of the lease,
sale, or other transfer of all rights in the program. Adaptations so pre-
pared may be transferred only with the authority of the copyright
owner.
Id. The difficulties with protecting software led Congress to appoint the Na-
tional Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
(CONTU) to study the problems of software protection. See Act of December
19, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (88 Stat.)
6849. The final report of the Commission led to the above amendment of the
Copyright Act. For the full text of the Commission's report, see Final Report of
the National Commission of New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (uly 31, 1978)
Section on Software Copyrights, 3 COMPUTER L.J. 53 (1981).
The Act bestows copyright protection upon computer programs despite the
language of § 102(b) which specifically states: "[l1n no case does copyright pro-
tection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, pro-
cess, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless
of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982). It is submitted that the combination of these
sections thereby implicitly classifies computer programs as tangible items.
118. See Wallace & Maher, supra note 8, at 79-80. One commentator has
suggested that this argument is purely academic:
[Tihe distinction [between tangibility and movability] appears to be
crucial to taxing authorities and those who seek to apply Article 2 of the
[U.C.C.] .... Such a distinction is likely a concern only to those who
worry about the purity and the symmetry of the law .... The fact that
the same computer program may be tangible under one law and intan-
gible under another will not delay the tax collectors on their appointed
rounds.
Bigelow, The Challenge of Computer Law, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 397, 404 (1985).
Another commentator has suggested that construction law may be an ap-
propriate paradigm for analyzing the sale of custom designed software. See Da-
vidson, supra note 100, at 1051.
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In Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc.,' 1 9 the District Court
for the Eastern District of New York noted that software consists of both
intangible intellectual property aspects, represented by ideas and con-
cepts, and the resulting product of those intellectual property aspects
which is software. 120 The court held that the system as a whole was
within the Article 2 definition of goods.' 2 ' On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit enunciated the general rule that
a "contract is for 'service' rather than 'sale' [only] when 'service pre-
dominates,' and the sale of items is 'incidental.' "122
Similarly, in RRX Industries, Inc. v. Lab-Con Inc., 123 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that, in determining whether
a contract is one for sale or to provide services, courts must look to the
essence of the agreement. 124 When a sale predominates, incidental
services rendered do not alter the basic transaction. 125 The court held
that the sale of software predominated in the transaction at bar.' 26
Thus, employee training, repair services and system upgrading were
merely incidental to the sale of the software package, and did not pre-
vent characterizing the computer system as a good.' 2 7
In Neilson Business Equipment Center, Inc. v. Monteleone 128 the Delaware
Supreme Court determined that the contract between Dr. Monteleone
and Neilson Business Equipment Center was a mixed contract for both
goods and services. 129 The court stated: "[w]hen a mixed contract is
presented, it is necessary for a court to review the factual circumstances
surrounding the negotiation, formation and contemplated performance
of the contract to determine whether the contract is predominantly or
119. 457 F. Supp. 765 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 604
F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979), aff'dafterremand, 651 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1981). Triangle
Underwriters, Inc. (Triangle), contracted with Honeywell for the purchase of
computer hardware, standard software, and custom designed software for the
purpose of supporting Triangle's printing lay-outs, word processing, billing, and
accounting. Id. at 739. After its installation, the system constantly and consist-
ently produced errors in billing and accounting. Id. at 740. After almost one
year of attempting to correct the problem, Honeywell personnel gave up and
departed from Triangle. Id. Triangle brought suit against Honeywell claiming
fraud, breach of contract, and negligence. Id. at 739.
120. Id. at 769.
121. Id.
122. 604 F.2d at 742 (quoting North American Leisure Corp. v. A & B Du-
plicators, Ltd., 468 F.2d 695, 697 (2d Cir. 1972)).
123. 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985). For a discussion of the facts and holding
in RRX Industries, see supra note 93.
124. Id. at 546.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 524 A.2d 1172 (Del. 1987). For a discussion of the facts and holding
in Neilson, see supra note 73.
129. Id. at 1174.
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primarily a contract for the sale of goods."13 0 The court based its deter-
mination that the contract was primarily for the sale of goods on Dr.
Monteleone's intent to purchase a "turn-key" system, and not to obtain
the hardware and software separately.' 3 '
By contrast, in Computer Servicenters, Inc. v. Beacon Manufacturing
Co.,' 3 2 an action involving a contract for data processing services, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower
court's ruling that, because the definition of goods is cast in terms of a
contract for sale, the contract in controversy was not for the sale of
goods but was for performance of services.133 Additionally, in Data
Processing Service, Inc. v. L. H. Smith Oil Corp.,' 3 4 which involved a contract
for the development of custom designed accounting software, the Indi-
ana Court of Appeals held that the parties contracted for services and
not for goods. 13 5 The court stated that "[t]he very terminology used by
the trial court and the parties here show services, not goods were that
for which Smith contracted. DPS was to act with specific regard to
Smith's need."' 36 The fact that the end result was to be delivered by
means of some physical manifestation of the services such as magnetic
tape, floppy disc or hard disc was immaterial and merely incidental. 13 7
Rather, the material element of the transaction was the purchaser's bar-
gaining for the vendor's "knowledge, skill, and ability."' 3 8
2. Computer Sales Fall Under the Implied Warranty of Merchantability
The U.C.C. provides that "a warranty that the goods shall be mer-
chantable is implied in a contract for their sale .... ,,t39 This contextual
warranty cannot be found in the standard computer contract; rather, it
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1174-75.
132. 328 F. Supp. 653 (D.S.C. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1971).
133. 443 F.2d at 906-07.
134. 492 N.E.2d 314 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). L.H. Smith Oil Corporation
(Smith) orally contracted with Data Processing Services, Inc., (DPS) for the cus-
tom development of accounting software for Smith's in-house computer system.
Id. at 316. After paying several DPS bills, Smith refused to pay any additional
hourly charges. DPS brought suit alleging breach of contract and open account.
Id.
135. Id. at 319.
136. Id. at 318 (emphasis in original).
137. Id. at 318-19.
138. Id. at 319.
139. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1978). The U.C.C. specifically provides:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that
the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if
the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this
section the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on
the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least as such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract
and description; and
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COMMENT
arises from the commercial setting surrounding the transaction.140 Yet,
"[a] warranty that the law implies from the existence of a written con-
tract is as much a part of the writing as the express terms of the
contract." 141
In Neilson, 14 2 the court reaffirmed this principle, declaring that
"[e]very contract of sale entered into by a merchant includes an implied
warranty that the goods sold be 'merchantable.' ",143 Additionally, a
"computer system, to be merchantable, must have been capable of pass-
ing without objection in the trade under the contract description, and be
fit for the ordinary purposes for which it was intended."' 14 4
The Neilson court enunciated the elements necessary to prove a
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. These elements are:
"(1) that a merchant sold the goods; (2) that such goods were not 'mer-
chantable' at the time of sale; (3) that plaintiff was damaged; (4) that the
damage was caused by the breach of the warranty of merchantability;
and (5) that the seller had notice of the damage."' 145 The court then
addressed the question whether Neilson's status as an "original equip-
ment manufacturer" (OEM) distributor, that is, a distributor of goods
which affixes its own label to products it resells,14 6 affected its classifica-
tion as a merchant.14 7 The court concluded that, although Neilson did
not manufacture the computer equipment purchased by Dr. Montele-
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality
within the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of
even kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all units
involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the
agreement may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on
the container or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied
warranties may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.
Id.
140. See W.R. Weaver Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 580 S.W.2d 76, 80 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1979).
141. Id.
142. For a discussion of the facts and holding in Neilson, see supra note 73.
143. Id. at 1175 (construing U.C.C. § 2-314(l)-(2) (1978)).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. An OEM is a company which purchases hardware.., and systems
software ... from a vendor and adds value, in the form of applications
software or other components, and then resells both the hardware and
software, [under its own label and at a profit, to purchasers.] .. . An
OEM is thus a type of middleman in the computer business.
AccuSystems, Inc. v. Honeywell Information Sys., Inc., 580 F. Supp. 474, 476
n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
147. Neilson, 524 A.2d at 1175 n.4. The court defined a merchant as "one
who regularly deals in goods of the kind involved or otherwise has a professional
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one, it held itself out as having a professional status with regard to com-
puters, thereby elevating it to the status of a merchant.' 4 8
In Cricket Alley Corp. v. Data Terminal Systems, Inc., 149 the Kansas
Supreme Court interpreted the implied warranty of merchantability as it
applied to computer cases. The court held that under the implied war-
ranty of merchantability computer equipment is warranted to be reliably
regular and consistent.' 50 In dictum, the court intimated that un-
dependability in a computer system is, in some ways, worse than not
owning a computer altogether.' 5'
Similarly, in Aubrey's R. V. Center, Inc. v. Tandy Corp.,152 the Washing-
ton Court of Appeals held that, although all of the hardware and some
of the programs did perform properly, the system as an integrated
whole did not.' 5 3 This fact supported a finding by the lower court of
substantial impairment, a prerequisite for revocation of acceptance
under the U.C.C. 1 5
4
Therefore, it seems that courts will apply the implied warranty of
merchantability to vaporware cases. However, when the parties have
status with regard to the goods involved such that he or she could be expected
to have specialized knowledge or skill peculiar to those goods." Id.
148. Id. The court's language rings of the professional status necessary to
maintain a cause of action for malpractice. For a discussion of computer mal-
practice, see infra notes 300-37 and accompanying text.
149. 240 Kan. 661, 732 P.2d 719 (1987). Cricket Alley Corporation
(Cricket), a chain of women's clothing retail stores, purchased ten Data Terminal
Systems (DTS) cash registers from a third-party retailer. It based its decision to
purchase these register's upon DTS's oral and written representations they
would communicate with Cricket's Wang computer system and transmit sales
and inventory information. Id. at 664, 732 P.2d at 721-22. Subsequently, the
DTS systems failed to consistently communicate properly with Cricket's Wang
computer, and Cricket replaced the DTS equipment with a similar system sold
by another manufacturer. Id. at 665, 732 P.2d at 722. Cricket brought suit
against DTS, Wang and the third-party retailer, alleging breach of express war-
ranty and seeking consequential and incidental damages. Id. at 664, 732 P.2d at
721-22.
150. Id. at 666, 732 P.2d at 722-23.
151. Id. at 668, 732 P.2d at 723.
152. 46 Wash. App. 595, 731 P.2d 1124 (1987). Radio Shack sold Aubrey's
R.V. Center, Inc. (Aubrey's), a computer manufactured by Tandy Corporation
(Tandy) and a third-party inventory and accounting software package which was
advertised in Radio Shack's catalog of software available for the Tandy com-
puter. Id. at 596-98, 731 P.2d at 1126. Aubrey's did not notice a disclaimer in
the front of the catalog which stated that Radio Shack neither supports nor serv-
ices third-party software advertised in the catalog, nor did Radio Shack's sales-
man explain this policy to the plaintiff. Id. at 597, 731 P.2d at 1126.
Subsequently, the third-party software proved to be full of "bugs." After at-
tempting to remedy the software problem for almost a year, Tandy ceased its
efforts and stopped communicating with Aubrey's. Id. at 598-99, 731 P.2d at
1126-27. Aubrey's brought suit against Tandy, seeking rescission of the sales
contract and damages. Id. at 599, 731 P.2d at 1127.
153. Id. at 602, 731 P.2d at 1128.
154. Id.
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contractually excluded the implied warranty of merchantability,' 5 5 a dis-
satisfied purchaser has sacrificed the causes of action available to it
under this warranty unless it can prove unconscionability. 156
3. Computer Sales Under the Implied Warranty of Fitness
for a Particular Purpose
The U.C.C. provides that when a seller reasonably knows or should
know at the time of contracting that the purchaser is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select suitable goods, the goods carry with
them an implied warranty that they will be fit for the purpose for which
they were purchased.157 When these elements are satisfied, the implied
warranty will in all instances attach to the goods, unless the parties have
contractually excluded them.' 58
In Neilson, 159 the court reiterated this principle and further held that
"[t]he buyer need not provide the seller with actual knowledge of the
particular purpose for which the goods are intended or of his reliance
on the seller's skill and judgment."' 160 Rather, the warranty will attach
to the goods if the circumstances are such that the seller merely has
reason to perceive the purpose intended or that reliance exists. 16 1
In Cricket Alley,' 62 the court indicated that the purchaser had indeed
relied on the advice of the seller.' 63 The court determined that the ca-
pability of new equipment to communicate with the plaintiff's computer
was the prime consideration in the transaction. The failure of this capa-
bility breached the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
155. For a discussion of limitation of damages, see infra notes 175-86 and
accompanying text.
156. For a discussion of unconscionability, see infra notes 219-39 and ac-
companying text.
157. U.C.C. § 2-315 (1978).
158. Id.
159. For a discussion of the facts and holding in Neilson, see supra note 73.
160. Neilson, 524 A.2d at 1175-76. In other words, the seller need not have
a subjective understanding of the purpose to which the purchaser will put the
goods.
161. Id. The court specifically stated:
There could hardly be a clearer case where a buyer relies on the profes-
sional expertise of the seller than that presented here. Dr. Monteleone
needed a system that would perform specific functions, and relied on
Neilson's professional expertise and experience in the computer and
information processing field to develop and deliver a satisfactory com-
puter system. Neilson clearly had reason to know of Monteleone's reli-
ance on the company's expertise and breached the warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose. Its liability is established under the [U.C.C.]
Id. at 1176.
162. For a discussion of the facts and holding in Cricket Alley, see supra note
149.
163. 240 Kan. at 666, 732 P.2d at 722.
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purpose. 16 4
The implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, therefore,
often attaches to the sale of computer merchandise. One commentator
suggests, however, that the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose should not attach to all sales of computer software.' 6 5 Most
software is designed to accomplish specific functions, such as accounting
or word processing. 166 However, to allow the warranty of fitness to at-
tach in all such instances would impose higher or additional obligations
upon the vendor, even though it had no direct dealings with the pur-
chaser and did not undertake any added responsibilities.' 6 7
4. Limitation of Remedy
The U.C.C. allows parties to a sales agreement to provide for reme-
dies in place of, or in addition to, those remedies otherwise provided in
the U.C.C. 168 Computer vendors will typically invoke this section and
warrant only that they will repair or replace defective equipment within
the warranty period. 169 Vendors' warranties may also provide that this
164. Id.
165. See Davidson, supra note 100, at 1052-53.
166. Id.
167. Id. This argument is fallacious. In the typical specialty software trans-
action, the purchaser relies upon the developer's catalogs or other literature to
aid its decision, and has no direct contact with the vendor. Furthermore, the
purchaser selects software for its specific capabilities, and often pays a large sum
of money-as much as several thousand dollars-for software which closely
meets the demands of a particularized application. To subject the sale of spe-
cialty software to a lower performance standard, such as the implied warranty of
merchantability's fitness for an ordinary purpose, would defeat the very reason
for the creation of such software.
168. U.C.C. § 2-719 (1978). The U.C.C. states in pertinent part:
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this sec-
tion and of the preceding section on liquidation and limitation of
damages,
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or
in substitution for those provided in this Article and may limit or alter
the measure of damages recoverable under this Article, as by limiting
the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and repayment of the price
or to repair and replacement of non-conforming goods or parts; and
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the rem-
edy is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole
remedy.
Id.
169. See Hunter v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 798 F.2d 299, 301 n.5 (8th Cir.
1986); Consolidated Terminals v. Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc., 708 F.2d 385,
391 n.5 (9th Cir. 1983); Earman Oil Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 625 F.2d 1291,
1294 nn.6-8 (5th Cir. 1980); AMF, Inc. v. Computer Automation, Inc., 573 F.
Supp. 924, 927 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Office Supply Co. v. Basic/Four Corp., 538 F.
Supp. 776, 778-79 (E.D. Wis. 1982); Honeywell Information Sys., Inc. v. Demo-
graphic Sys., Inc., 396 F. Supp. 273, 275-76 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Kalil Bottling
Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 127 Ariz. 278, 279-80, 619 P.2d 1055, 1056-57 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1980); Saltzberg & Heffernan, supra note 10, at 538; Comment, supra
note 6, at 261-62; see also Gordon & Starr, supra note 15, at 498 ("[f]urthermore,
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limited remedy is exclusive. 170
In Office Supply Co., Inc. v. Basic/Four Corp.,17 1 the court determined
that this practice was permissible under the U.C.C.17 2 In particular, the
court allowed an exclusion of all implied warranties and a provision for a
ninety-day express warranty limited to repair and replacement.1 73 The
court based its determination on its approval of similar contractual pro-
visions in a previous case, and other courts' implicit approval of such
provisions. 17
4
Limitation of remedy provisions are advantageous to both parties to
a computer sales agreement. If a computer system fails, the vendor is in
the best position to provide the services and parts required to correct its
defects. The purchaser will thereby receive the initially bargained-for
product. Additionally, the vendor may contract to repair only those
products which it is able to repair. Thus, courts have enforced such pro-
visions and recognized rights and duties created by them.
5. Limitation of Damages
The U.C.C. permits parties to a computer contract to agree upon
liquidated damages 175 and to limit consequential damages. 17 6 The
U.C.C. also permits parties to exclude implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. 17 7 This implies
the warranty period should be limited in duration because developed software is
rarely free of coding errors even after years of use").
170. See Comment, supra note 6, at 261.
171. 538 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Wis. 1982). For a discussion of the facts and
holding in Office Supply, see supra note 62.
172. 538 F. Supp. at 783.
173. Id.
174. Id..
175. U.C.C. § 2-718 (1978).
176. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1978). The U.C.C. states: "Consequential dam-
ages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is uncon-
scionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the
case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages
where the loss is commercial is not." Id.
177. U.C.C. § 2-316 (1978). The U.C.C. states:
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express war-
ranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be
construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but sub-
ject to the provisions of this Article on parol or extrinsic evidence (Sec-
tion 2-202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such
construction is unreasonable.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied
warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention
merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to
exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be
by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warran-
ties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are no
warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof."
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
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that the vendor may be exculpated from liability for all types of dam-
ages, including direct, consequential and incidental damages, which
arise under these implied warranties. Furthermore, parties may allocate
or divide the risks of nonperformance or defect among themselves in
any proportion they choose.1 78
Vendors commonly insert disclaimers of all types of damages and,
in case those fail in court, include a clause limiting their total liability
under the contract to some maximum amount. 179 One commentator
suggests that the use of such maximum liability clauses seems less offen-
sive than the use of type-specific damage disclaimers.' 80 When the
amount of maximum liability is less than the purchase price, the limita-
tion may amount to an assumption of risk by the purchaser. 18 1
In Office Supply, 182 the court held that damage limitation clauses are
valid.' 83 Moreover, in a commercial setting damage limitation clauses
are presumptively valid and the contracting parties are presumed to
have acted at arm's length. 184 Indeed, the United States Court of Ap-
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied
warranties are excluded by expressions like "as is", "with all faults" or
other language which in common understanding calls the buyer's atten-
tion to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no
implied warranty; and
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has ex-
amined the goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has
refused to examine the goods there is no implied warranty with regard
to defects which an examination ought in the circumstances to have
revealed to him; and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by
course of dealing or course of performance or usage of trade.
(4) Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance
with the provisions of this Article on liquidation or limitation of dam-
ages and on contractual modification of remedy (Sections 2-718 and 2-
719).
Id.
178. U.C.C. § 2-303 (1978). The U.C.C. states: "Where this Article allo-
cates a risk or a burden as between the parties 'unless otherwise agreed', the
agreement may not only shift the allocation but may also divide the risk or bur-
den." Id.
179. See Comment, supra note 6, at 262 n.29. The damage ceiling provision
apparently excludes consideration of liquidated damage issues. Id.
180. Id. The impact of type-specific disclaimers is generally unknown until
litigation begins. Id. Thus, the parties may find it more satisfying, and perhaps
strategic, to limit their total exposure to some maximum liability in advance.
Furthermore, purchasers may object to overly expansive type-specific disclaim-
ers, for the most limited warranty "is no warranty at all." See Gordon & Starr,
supra note 15, at 497-98.
181. See Comment, supra note 6, at 262 n.29.
182. For a discussion of the facts and holding in Office Supply, see supra note
62.
183. 538 F. Supp. at 789 (construing CAL. COM. CODE § 2719(3) (Deering
1973)).
184. Id.
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peals for the Eighth Circuit stated in Hunter v. Texas Instruments, Inc.' 8 5
that damage limitation clauses may also properly be used to limit manu-
facturers' liability in remote contracts to which the manufacturer is not a
party. 186
Damage limitation clauses are, therefore, proper in computer con-
tracts. In some instances, they may even be an attractive means for the
parties to predetermine their exposure to potential liability. Conse-
quently, damage limitation clauses may help parties to create precise
computer contracts which leave little room for judicial interpretation or
construction.
6. Conspicuousness
The U.C.C. provides that, in order to exclude or modify the implied
warranty of merchantability, the relevant contractual language must
state "merchantability" and be conspicuous.' 87 In order to exclude the
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, the relevant con-
tractual language must only be conspicuous. 18 8 The U.C.C. defines the
term "conspicuous" as language which "a reasonable person against
whom it is to operate ought to have noticed .... ."189 Furthermore,
language in the body of a contract is "conspicuous" if it is in "larger or
other contrasting type or color."' 190
The test of conspicuousness is objective: it is "whether attention
can reasonably be expected to be called to [the contractual lan-
guage]."' 9 1 The objective nature of conspicuousness was reiterated by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Hunter.
19 2
There, the court found that the contractual disclaimer, which was in
larger type than the surrounding language, satisfied the U.C.C. standard
and was indeed conspicuous.1 9
3
Therefore, it appears that the issue of conspicuousness is a question
of law which must be decided by the court. 194 The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Ohio reiterated this principle in
AMF, Inc. v. Computer Automation, Inc. 195 The court rejected AMF's "con-
spicuousness defense," holding that a business as large as AMF should
185. 798 F.2d 299 (8th Cir. 1986). For a discussion of the facts and holding
in Hunter, see supra note 80.
186. Id. at 302.
187. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1978). For the text of this section, see supra note
177.
188. Id.
189. U.C.C. § 1-201(10) (1978).
190. Id.
191. U.C.C. § 1-201 comment 10 (1978).
192. For a discussion of the facts and holding in Hunter, see supra note 80.
193. 798 F.2d at 302-03.
194. U.C.C. § 1-201(10) (1978); See also Hunter, 798 F.2d at 302.
195. 573 F. Supp. 924 (S.D. Ohio 1983). AMF, Inc., (AMF) purchased a
faulty computer system from Computer Automation, Inc. (CAI). Id. at 926.
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have been, and most likely was, aware of the language disclaiming im-
plied warranties. 196 It therefore appears that in a commercial setting
courts should presume that parties subjectively and objectively under-
stand such disclaimers.
This principle had already been expressed in dicta by the Texas
Court of Appeals in W.R. Weaver Co. v. Burroughs Corp.'9 7 In Weaver, a
computer lease contained a disclaimer of all warranties and all prior rep-
resentations which was written in lower case lettering. 19 8 Although the
court stated that the U.C.C. precluded application of the conspicuous-
ness standard to the lease, it nonetheless held that the contractual dis-
claimer was "so written that a person against whom it would operate
should have noticed it, particularly since this is a commercial
transaction." 19 9
In contrast, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Wisconsin held in Office Supply20 0 that disclaimers written in italicized
print, in contrast to the regular print used on the rest of the contract, are
nevertheless inconspicuous.2 0 ' The court held, however, that when a
buyer is actually aware of a warranty disclaimer, then the disclaimer is
effective even if it is not conspicuous. 20 2
In light of the above, courts will not allow an inconspicuousness
defense against a warranty disclaimer when the party against whom en-
forcement is sought should have been, or actually was, aware of a dis-
claimer. The above decisions clearly reflect the objective test of
conspicuousness found in the U.C.C. In addition, where the purchaser
was actually aware of a disclaimer, it may not rely upon an inconspicu-
ousness defense, notwithstanding the conspicuousness of the dis-
claimer. Thus, it appears that the judiciary has imposed an additional
and alternative subjective standard on such claims.
7. Failure of an Express Warranty's Essential Purpose
The U.C.C. provides that express warranties may be created by the
purchaser's reliance upon any oral or written affirmation of fact, promise
or description of the goods. 20 3 However, in some circumstances an ex-
AMF brought suit against CAI, claiming breach of contract, breach of warranty,
gross negligence, misrepresentation, and strict liability. Id.
196. Id. at 929.
197. W.R. Weaver Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 580 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Ct. App.
1979). For a discussion of the facts and holding in Weaver, see supra note 84.
198. Id. at 81.
199. Id.
200. For a discussion of the facts and holding in Office Supply, see supra note
62.
201. Id. at 783-84.
202. Id. at 784.
203. U.C.C. § 2-313 (1978). The U.C.C. provides:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the
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press warranty may be claimed to have failed of its "essential pur-
pose." °20 4 For example, a limited repair remedy fails of its essential
purpose when the "warranted goods fail to perform according to specifi-
cations as warranted despite the seller's efforts to repair .... -205
In the event that an express warranty fails of its essential purpose, a
purchaser may pursue any remedy available under the U.C.C., despite
contractual damage and warranty disclaimers. 20 6 Such "otherwise avail-
able damages" may include consequential damages which are generally
"exactly what the disappointed buyer is seeking."' 20 7 However, courts
differ as to whether failure of essential purpose of a limited remedy does
indeed negate an otherwise valid disclaimer of consequential
damages. 2 08
In RRX Industries, Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc.,209 the majority determined
that a plaintiff may pursue the U.C.C.'s otherwise available remedies for
breach of contract if its exclusive or limited remedy fails of its essential
purpose. 210 However, the minority posited that a "repair remedy
[which] failed of its essential purpose does not automatically lead to the
further conclusion that a limitation of damages provision should not be
buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the
affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis
of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform
to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall
conform to the description.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the
seller use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he
have a specific intention to make a warranty ....
Id. An example of an express warranty may be found in Weaver, where Bur-
roughs gave oral and written "assurances." 580 S.W.2d at 81 (construing TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.313 (Vernon 1968)). For a discussion of limitation
of remedies, see supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
204. U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (1978).
205. Consolidated Data Terminals v. Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc., 708
F.2d 385, 392 (9th Cir. 1983) (construing U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (1978)). For a dis-
cussion of the facts and holding in Consolidated Data, see supra note 86.
206. U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (1978).
207. See Saltzberg & Heffernan, supra note 10, at 538.
208. See Comment, supra note 6, at 262 & n.26.
209. 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985). For a discussion of the facts and holding
in RRX Industries, see supra note 93.
210. Id. at 547 (distinguishing S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 587
F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978) ("where parties agree to limitation of damages provi-
sion, courts should not alter bargained-for risk allocation unless breach of con-
tract is so fundamental that it causes loss which is not part of [contemplated]
allocation")). Contra Consolidated Data Terminals v. Applied Digital Data Sys.,
Inc., 708 F.2d 385, 392 (9th Cir. 1983).
1988] COMMENT 869
35
Weikers: Computer Malpractice and Other Legal Problems Posed by Computer V
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1988
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
enforced. ' '2 11 Allowing the plaintiff to resort to all of the remedies
under the U.C.C., the dissent argued, ignores the fundamental goal of
section 2-719 to require parties to accept the legal consequences of a
contract.
2 12
The AMF court 21 3 held that whether a limited remedy failed of its
essential purpose "will depend on whether the warrantor diligently
made repairs, whether the repairs cured the defects, and whether the
consequential loss in the interim was negligible. 2 1 4 The court further
held that consequential losses need not be considered if the contract
excludes liability for them.2 15 In contrast to AMF, the Office Supply 2 1 6
court held that "[i]f a remedy is limited to repair and consequential and
incidental damages are excluded, . . . then even if the repair remedy fails
of its essential purpose, the buyer is limited to his breach of the bargain
damages." 21 7 But if the purchaser can prove that the exclusion of inci-
dental and consequential damages was unconscionable, it may recover
breach of the bargain, incidental and consequential damages. 2 18
Thus, an express warranty fails of its essential purpose when the
good does not perform as warranted and the vendor either cannot or
will not resolve the defect. In these circumstances, purchasers are enti-
tled to recover damages available under the U.C.C., such as breach of
the bargain damages, and perhaps even consequential and incidental
damages. When a contract also contains type-specific damage disclaim-
ers, however, the courts are split as to whether a purchaser may recover
consequential and incidental damages under the U.C.C.
8. Unconscionability
The issue of the unconscionability of computer contract provisions
is one of the most widely litigated areas of computer law. Additionally,
211. RRX Industries, 772 F.2d at 549 (Norris, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
212. Id. (Norris,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing U.C.C.
§ 2-719 comment 1 (1978)).
213. For a discussion of the facts in AMF, see supra note 195.
214. Id. at 928.
215. Id. Accord Kalil Bottling Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 127 Ariz. 278, 282,
619 P.2d 1055, 1059 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980).
The AMF court further held that, although most cases addressing failure of
essential purpose have decided it as a matter of law, the U.C.C. does not man-
date that this issue is a question for the Court to decide. 573 F. Supp. at 928 n.2.
216. 538 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Wis. 1982). For a discussion of the facts and
holding in Office Supply, see supra note 62.
217. 538 F. Supp. at 787-88 (citing Chatlos Sys. v. National Cash Register
Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.J. 1979), revd as to damages, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir.
1980), aff'd, 670 F.2d 1304 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1112 (1982)).
218. Id. at 787. The court based its determinations on the principle that a
damage exclusion is separate and distinct from a limitation of remedy to repair,
and it must receive consideration above and beyond the remainder of the con-
tract. Id. at 788.
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it has received more treatment in secondary sources than any other com-
puter contract related issue. Although no court has yet adopted uncon-
scionability as a means of vitiating oppressive contractual disclaimers in
computer sales, commentators collectively favor its application in this
area and several cases contain language strikingly similar to language
found in these commentators' articles.
The U.C.C. provides that courts may exclude unconscionable por-
tions of a contract or strike a contract as a whole if it contains uncon-
scionable provisions.2 1 9 The U.C.C. also specifically imposes this
principle upon damage disclaimers. 2 20 Interpretation of the U.C.C. has
yielded two types of unconscionability: procedural unconscionability,
which is characterized by the "absence of meaningful choice;" and sub-
stantive unconscionability, which involves unjust and harsh contract
terms which are "unreasonably favorable to the other party."
22 1
Procedural unconscionability has two components: "oppression,"
which results from unequal bargaining power; and "unfair surprise,"
which results from hidden contractual terms that one party seeks to en-
force against the other.2 22 Substantive unconscionability usually in-
volves harsh, one-sided terms. 22
3
The criteria by which a court will determine the existence of uncon-
scionability are: "(i) examination of the negotiation process and length
of time in dealing; (ii) the length of time for deliberations; (iii) the expe-
rience or astuteness of the parties; (iv) whether counsel reviewed the
contract; and (v) whether the buyer was a reluctant purchaser." 2 24
Computer hardware and software purchasers frequently argue that
warranty and damage disclaimers are unconscionable in order to avoid
219. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978). The U.C.C. provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause
of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remain-
der of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit
the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any uncon-
scionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or
any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded
a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial set-
ting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination.
Id.
220. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1978). For the text of § 2-719(3), see supra note
176.
221. See Leff, Unconscionability and The Code-the Emperor's New Clause, 115 U.
PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967); Wallace & Maher, supra note 8, at 72-73.
222. See Wallace & Maher, supra note 8, at 72-73.
223. Id.
224. See Earman Oil Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 625 F.2d 1291, 1299 (5th Cir.
1980); Office Supply Co. v. Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776, 788 (E.D. Wis.
1982) (citing Earman, 625 F.2d at 1299). See also Saltzberg & Heffernan, supra
note 10, at 536 (citing Earman, 625 F.2d at 1299).
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their harsh effects. 22 5 However, their claims have been categorically un-
successful, regardless whether they allege procedural or substantive
unconscionability. 22 6
Most claims of unconscionability have been between commercial
parties. This was the crucial factor in the Fifth Circuit's denial of the
plaintiff's unconscionability claim in Earman Oil Co. v. Burroughs Corp.2 2 7
The court held that in commercial settings businessmen are presumed
to act at arm's length; thus, neither procedural nor substantive uncon-
scionability will attach.2 28
In Hunter v. Texas Instruments, Inc.,2 29 the Eighth Circuit focused on
the purchaser's subjective knowledge and experience in denying
Hunter's unconscionability claim.2 30 The court took note of the pur-
chaser's college education and the fact that he shopped around exten-
sively before selecting the computer he eventually purchased. 23 ' Thus,
the court found neither the absence of meaningful choice on the part of
the plaintiff nor terms unreasonably favorable to the defendant. 2 32
In AMF Inc. v. Computer Automation, Inc.,233 the purchaser claimed
225. See Comment, supra note 6, at 263.
226. See, e.g., Hunter v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 798 F.2d 299, 303-04 (8th
Cir. 1986) (procedural); Earman, 625 F.2d 1291 (procedural); Horning v. Sycom,
556 F. Supp. 819, 821 (E.D. Ky. 1983) ("boiler plate" bordering on procedural);
Office Supply, 538 F. Supp. 776 (substantive); AMF, Inc. v. Computer Automation,
Inc., 573 F. Supp. 924 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (substantive and procedural); Chatlos
Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.J. 1979), rev'd
as to damages, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir.) (procedural), aff'd, 670 F.2d 1304 (3d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1112 (1982); Badger Bearing Co. v. Burroughs
Corp., 444 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (substantive), aff'd without opinion, 588
F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1978); Burroughs Corp. v. Chesapeake Petroleum & Supply
Co., 282 Md. 406, 384 A.2d 734 (1978) (procedural). See also Comment, supra
note 6, at 263.
227. 625 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1980). For a discussion of the facts and hold-
ing in Earman, see supra note 77.
228. Id. at 1300. Although the presumption against unconscionability is re-
buttable, see U.C.C. § 2-302(2) (1978), Earman failed to prove that the agree-
ment was unconscionable. Earman, 625 F.2d at 1300. The court stated that the
"procedural sort of unconscionability alleged by Earman requires a showing of
overreaching or sharp practices by the seller and ignorance or inexperience on
the buyer's part, resulting in a lack of meaningful bargaining by the parties." Id.
(citingJ. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-3 (1972)). Ac-
cord Consolidated Data Terminals v. Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc., 708 F.2d
385, 392 n.6 (9th Cir. 1983).
The burden of demonstrating unconscionability of a limitation of remedies
or damages provision lies with the plaintiff. AMF Inc. v. Computer Automation, Inc.,
573 F. Supp. at 930.
229. 798 F.2d 299 (8th Cir. 1986). For a discussion of the facts and holding
in Hunter, see supra note 80.
230. Id. at 303-04.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 304.
233. 573 F. Supp. 924 (S.D. Ohio 1983). For a discussion of the facts and
holding in AM!', see supra note 195.
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procedural unconscionability based on the inconspicuous nature of war-
ranty disclaimers.2 34 The court held that mere inconspicuousness is not
sufficient to establish unconscionability under the U.C.C.23 5 The court
also denied AMF's substantive unconscionability claim.2 3 6
Perhaps the closest that any court has come to invoking the uncon-
scionability doctrine in a computer sales case is in Horning v. Sycom. 2 3 7
In Homing, a solo medical practitioner sought protection from a contrac-
tual forum selection clause under the principle of procedural unconscio-
nability.23 8 While the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Kentucky denied this argument, it recognized the disparity in
bargaining power and stated:
While the court cannot say that the defendant has engaged in
overreaching, it does regard the clause as bordering on uncon-
scionability as applied to the sale of an important piece of office
machinery to a small businessman for the substantial price in-
volved .... The forum selection clause is only one of many
clauses in the form contract that together represent the best
job of boiler-plating since the building of the Monitor.2 3 9
Thus, courts have largely ignored the unconscionability claims of
parties to computer contracts. These denials have occurred repeatedly
regardless of whether the contract negotiating environment was com-
mercial or otherwise. However, it appears that courts may be moving in
the direction of allowing unconscionability claims where the vendor is a
relatively large commercial entity and the purchaser, regardless of its
size, is inexperienced in the use of computers.
It is submitted that courts should more liberally invoke the doctrine
of unconscionability than they do in other areas of the law. Unconscio-
nability should apply in all compelling vaporware cases where purchas-
ers are individuals or relatively small business entities, and are not
members of the computer industry. However, the doctrine should not
apply to vaporware cases involving large commercial entities or purchas-
ers of any size that are members of the computer industry.
C. Fraud and Misrepresentation
Computer experts and neophytes alike often depend on the advice
234. Id. at 930.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. 556 F. Supp. 819 (E.D. Ky. 1983). Dr. Charles Horning (Horning),
leased a computer manufactured by Tandy Corporation and software developed
by Sycom, all of which failed to operate properly. Id. at 820. Horning brought
suit against Tandy, Sycom, and a third-party leasing company, claiming breach
of contract, breach of U.C.C. warranties, negligence, and fraud. Id. at 821.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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of salespeople in selecting computer equipment. 240 In the course of
procuring sales, a computer vendor will often make written and oral
statements designed to induce the user to select its products and serv-
ices. 24 1 Some of these statements are mere puffery, 24 2 while others may
provide the basis of the bargain. Those statements which provide the
basis of the bargain and are untrue may provide an additional basis for a
lawsuit for fraud or misrepresentation.
Recently, dissatisfied computer purchasers have brought causes of
action for fraud and misrepresentation against vendors with increasing
frequency. 24 3 If a purchaser can show that any of a vendor's representa-
tions were made with the intent to induce the purchase of the vendor's
products and services, that the misstatement was material, and that the
purchaser obtained the vendor's system relying on such a misstatement
to its detriment, then a valid cause of action for fraud will lie.2 44
In Management Assistance, Inc. v. Computer Dimensions, Inc.,24 5 the
240. For a discussion of the interaction between computer salespeople and
purchasers, see supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
241. See Saltzberg & Heffernan, supra note 15, at 539-40.
242. See Comment, supra note 6, at 257; see also Sierra Diesel Injection Serv.
v. Burroughs Corp., 651 F. Supp. 1371, 1377 (D. Nev. 1987) (statements of
opinion are not actionable).
243. See Graphic Sales, Inc. v. Sperry Corp., 824 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1987);
Management Sys. Assoc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 762 F.2d 1161, 1173-75
(4th Cir. 1985); Consolidated Data Terminals v. Applied Digital Data Sys., 708
F.2d 385, 395 (9th Cir. 1983); Dunn Appraisal Co. v. Honeywell Information
Sys., Inc., 687 F.2d 877, 882 (6th Cir. 1982); Glovatorium, Inc. v. National Cash
Register Corp., 684 F.2d 658, 660 (9th Cir. 1982); Earman Oil Co. v. Burroughs
Corp., 625 F.2d 1291, 1299 (5th Cir. 1980); Sierra Diesel Injection Serv. v. Bur-
roughs Corp., 648 F. Supp. 1148, 1150 (D. Nev. 1986), reh'g denied, 651 F. Supp.
1371 (D. Nev. 1987); AccuSystems, Inc. v. Honeywell Information Sys., 580 F.
Supp. 474, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); AMF, Inc. v. Computer Automation, Inc., 573
F. Supp. 924, 932 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Management Assistance, Inc. v. Computer
Dimensions, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 666, 668-71 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Kalil Bottling Co.
v. Burroughs Corp., 127 Ariz. 278, 281, 619 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1980).
244. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEE-
TON ON TORTS 727-29 (5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525
(1977); Saltzberg & Heffernan, supra note 15, at 539-40.
245. 546 F. Supp. 666 (N.D. Ga. 1982). In Management Assistance, after ne-
gotiating a complex series of agreements, Computer Dimensions, Inc. (CDI), a
computer retailer, contracted for the purchase of computer equipment from
Management Assistance, Inc. (MAI), a computer equipment wholesale distribu-
tor, allegedly based on the latter's promise to enter a distribution agreement
which would provide for volume discounts to CDI. Id. at 668-71. During the
course of these negotiations, CDI signed a letter of intent provided by MAI
which enumerated the sales terms, released MAI from any and all liability arising
from the specified computer equipment, and released MAI from any previously
made commitments. Id. The delivered equipment was non-functional, but was
repaired by MAI after two years. Id. Additionally, the parties did not enter into
a distribution agreement. Id. CDI brought suit against MAI, alleging, among
other things, fraud, promissory estoppel, and lack of good faith under the
U.C.C. Id.
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United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia enunci-
ated the elements necessary to establish a fraud claim:
(1) [A] misrepresentation by defendant of a material existing
fact, (2) with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disre-
gard as to whether it was true, (3) with intent to deceive plain-
tiff, and (4) plaintiff acted upon the misrepresentation in
reasonable reliance upon its veracity in a manner which caused
proximate injury. 24 6
The court rejected the plaintiff's claim of fraud 247 because the plaintiff's
signature had not been "obtained by trick or artifice." '248
In AccuSystems, Inc. v. Honeywell Information Systems, Inc.,24 9 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the
elements for fraud in the inducement consist of a representation of fact
which: 1) was recklessly made or known by the vendor to be untrue;
246. Id. at 671; see also Consolidated Data Terminals v. Applied Digital Data
Sys., Inc., 708 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1983).
The Court for the Southern District of Ohio stated the elements somewhat
differently:
[U]nder both Ohio and California law, a plaintiff must prove the exist-
ence of various elements of fraud, including: (1) an actual or implied
representation, (2) which relates to the present or past, (3) which was
material to the transactions, (4) was false when made, (5) made with
knowledge of its falsity, or with reckless disregard of its truth, (6) made
with intent to mislead the other party into relying upon it, causing
(7) justifiable reliance and (8) injury.
AMF, Inc. v. Computer Automation, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 924, 933 (citing Dunn
Appraisal Co. v. Honeywell Information Sys., 687 F.2d 877, 882 (6th Cir. 1982)
(suit involving breach of contract and warranty, applying Ohio law)).
247. Management Assistance, Inc. v. Computer Dimensions, Inc., 546 F.
Supp. 666, 671-72 (N.D. Ga. 1982). The court also rejected the plaintiff's claim
for "failure to perform contractual duties in good faith." The court stated:
Failure to act in good faith in the performance or enforcement of con-
tracts or duties under [Georgia's UCC] does not-state a claim for which
relief may be granted .... Nor have we been able to discover a jurisdiction
which allows recovery of damages under this general provision of the Uniform
Commercial Code.
Id. at 677 (quoting Chandler v. Hunter, 340 So. 2d 818, 821 (Ala. Civ. App.
1976)) (emphasis in original).
248. Id. at 671-72 (citation omitted).
249. 580 F. Supp. 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Honeywell Information Systems,
Inc. (Honeywell), agreed to provide software licenses and maintenance to Ac-
cuSystems, Inc. (AccuSystems). Honeywell represented to the president of Ac-
cuSystems that their Level 6 computer and its TL-6 operating system would
support 32 terminals and perform complicated multi-tasking. Id. at 476. The
agreements contained extensive limitations on damages and remedies available
to AccuSystems. Id. at 476-77. Subsequently, the entire hardware and software
system proved to be inadequate for AccuSystems' multi-tasking needs, and Ac-
cuSystems was forced to go out of business. Id. at 477. After nine months of
system failure, AccuSystems brought suit against Honeywell, claiming breach of
contract, negligence, fraud in the inducement, and "negligent misrepresenta-
tion." Id. at 478-79.
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2) was offered to deceive the purchaser into acting upon the representa-
tion; and 3) caused injury.250 The court found in favor of the purchaser
on the fraud claim, but denied recovery of lost profits and punitive dam-
ages, because "[t]he evidence [did] not establish that the false represen-
tations were made maliciously or wantonly or that Honeywell's conduct
was actuated by evil motives." 25 1
In Graphic Sales, Inc. v. Sperry Corp.,2 52 a purchaser brought suit
against a computer vendor, seeking additional computer software that
the vendor had advertised along with the purchased computer. 2 53 The
advertisement did not expressly state that the software was "bundled"
with the computer; rather, it merely stated that the software was "avail-
able." Therefore, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit decided as a matter of law that no misrepresentation had oc-
curred, and dismissed the action. 254 In a similar case,2 55 however, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that ques-
tions of misrepresentation are for the jury to decide. 25 6
250. Id. at 482. Furthermore, the plaintiffs must produce clear and con-
vincing evidence of the fraud. Id.
251. Id. at 483. The court also dismissed the plaintiff's cause of action for
"negligent misrepresentation" because the claim is not recognized by New York
courts in the "absence of some special relationship of trust or confidence be-
tween the parties." Id. at 480.
252. 824 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1987). In Graphic Sales, after having researched
computers for one year, George E. Price, president of Graphic Sales, negotiated
for a period of two weeks with Robert W. Johnson, a Sperry sales representative,
for the lease of a Sperry computer system to be used in conjunction with Mr.
Price's printing and publishing business. Id. at 577. During the negotiations,
Johnson described Sperry hardware and software which he felt would suit Price's
purposes. Id. Before executing the lease agreement, Price's attorney reviewed
and approved the agreement, which provided for separate lease charges for the
hardware and software. Id. Subsequently, Price complained to Sperry that the
system did not work according to contract specifications. Id. at 578. Price
brought action against Sperry claiming fraud in the inducement, common law
fraud, and violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act. Id. Price alleged that Sperry represented that the software was
"bundled" with the hardware. Id. Sperry filed a counterclaim for amounts due
under the agreement. The district court entered judgment in favor of Sperry,
and the circuit court affirmed. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Management Sys. Assoc., v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 762 F.2d 1161
(4th Cir. 1985). McAUTO, a subsidiary of McDonnell Douglas Corporation,
agreed to acquire specialty hospital software from Management Systems Associ-
ates, Inc. (MSA), through a purchase contract and a service contract. Id. at 1163.
Under the purchase contract, MSA agreed to sell, deliver, and license its
software to McAUTO, and to fully disclose to McAUTO all of the software's
capabilities. Id. MSA brought suit against McAUTO, for, among other things,
royalties allegedly owing to it. Id. at 1164. McAUTO counterclaimed. arguing
that MSA breached its portion of the contract insofar as it failed to deliver essen-
tial parts of the software system at the time provided under the purchase con-
tract, and that MSA misrepresented that its system was integrated. Id.
256. Id. at 1181. MSA contended that the facts disproved McAUTO's claim
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Although fraud is tortious conduct which is compensable despite
contractual disclaimers, courts have in several computer fraud cases
applied contract law. In Earman Oil Co. v. Burroughs Corp. ,257 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that integration clauses
in sales contracts prevent consideration of prior representations. 258
The court enigmatically stated that "the misrepresentation claim is in
essence a contract-related claim and thus redundant and
impermissible.,"259
Additionally, in Kalil Bottling Co. v. Burroughs Corp.,260 the Arizona
Court of Appeals held that a sales contract specifically negated the de-
fendant's alleged misrepresentations. 2 6 1 Consequently, the plaintiff's
claims for negligent misrepresentation, fraud and consumer fraud,
based upon statements made prior to the signing of the contract, were
not permitted under the parol evidence rule. 26 2
By contrast, in Sierra Diesel Injection Services v. Burroughs Corp. ,263 the
court held that the parol evidence rule may not be invoked in order to
exclude evidence of fraud in the inducement of a contract, even where
the court finds an integrated agreement. 264 The court based its conclu-
sion on the principle that fraud in the inducement invalidates the entire
contract.
265
In dictum, the Sierra court distinguished statements of opinion and
statements of fact. 26 6 The court posited that mere puffery is "outside
the scrutiny of courts."'2 6 7 Additionally, the determination whether a
statement is one of opinion or fact must be made in light of the context
and circumstances in which it was made. 2 68
that the software was misrepresented as integrated, in that the software could be
integrated, though at considerable expense. Id.
257. 625 F.2d 1291, 1299 (5th Cir. 1980). For a discussion of the facts and
holding in Earman, see supra note 77.
258. Id. at 1298.
259. Id. at 1294 n.10.
260. 127 Ariz. 278, 619 P.2d 1055 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980). For a discussion
of the facts and holding in Kalil, see supra note 65.
261. 127 Ariz. at 282, 619 P.2d at 1058.
262. Id. at 282, 619 P.2d at 1058.
263. 651 F. Supp. 1371 (D. Nev. 1987). For a discussion of the facts and
holding in Sierra, see supra note 67.
264. Id. at 1377.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. The Sierra Diesel court stated: "This rule recognizes that a certain
amount of 'puffing' is present in virtually every commercial transaction, and that
such statements of opinion must be allowed to pass outside the scrutiny of the
courts." Id.
268. Id. The court stated that "[a]s to whether a statement is mere 'puf-
fing,' or whether it is an actual factual representation, however, it seems that the
context and circumstances in which the statements are made is crucial." Id.
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In Consolidated Data Terminals v. Applied Digital Data Systems, Inc., 26 9
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized that
plaintiffs commonly and vehemently argue fraud claims, because they
may be entitled to recover punitive damages if they prevail.270 Addi-
tionally, the court held that direct damages under a fraud theory are
based on an "out-of-pocket" measure, as opposed to a contract theory's
"benefit-of-the-bargain" measure. 27'
Thus, those courts that have tried fraud claims in the context of
computer sales have established several rules. The elements necessary
to establish a fraud claim are: (1) defendant's misrepresentation of a
material existing fact; (2) defendant's knowledge that it was false, or
reckless disregard as to whether it was true; (3) defendant intended to
deceive plaintiff; and (4) plaintiff acted in reasonable reliance upon the
veracity of the misrepresentation in a manner which proximately caused
injury. The determination whether a statement is one of fact or opinion
should be left to the fact finder. The parol evidence rule, in combina-
tion with a contractual integration clause, may bar fraud claims in some
jurisdictions. Finally, if the plaintiff prevails, it may recover "out-of-
pocket" direct damages and perhaps punitive damages as well.
D. Damages
Inherent in the sale of each computer system are direct and indirect
risks of the failure of technology and the seller's nonperformance due to
management or financial problems. 272 Because businesses generally
rely heavily on the use of computers,273 a system failure may cause an
individual business to suffer substantial losses or perhaps even bank-
269. 708 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1983). For a discussion of the facts and holding
in Consolidated Data, see supra note 86.
270. Id. at 393-94. But see AccuSystems, Inc. v. Honeywell Information Sys.,
580 F. Supp. 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (award of punitive damages depends on false
representations made maliciously or wantonly or on conduct actuated by evil
motives).
271. 708 F.2d at 393-94. There may be no practical distinction, because
the two measures of damages may yield the same result. Id. This was the result
in Consolidated Data. Id.
272. R. BERNACCHI & G. LARSEN, DATA PROCESSING CONTRACTS AND THE
LAw 23 (1974). Specifically, these risks consist of:
1. direct risks associated with the failure of technology;
2. indirect risks associated with consequential events due to the
failure of technology;
3. direct risks of nonperformance due to financial problems in
the seller's organization;
4. direct risks of nonperformance or delayed performance due to
management failures in the seller's organization.
Id.
273. The manufacturing and service industries alike depend on computers
to run large portions of their business. Computers are used to control heavy
machinery, robots, data storage and retrieval, and other vital business functions.
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ruptcy.27 4 Thus, it is important for computer purchasers to know
whether and what damages are recoverable from their potentially disas-
trous purchases of vaporware.
1. Damages Available Under Contract Theories
In the event of a vendor's nondelivery of computer goods in breach
of a contract, or the vendor's repudiation of that contract, the purchaser
is entitled to recover the difference between the market value of the
goods at the time of breach and the contract price, plus incidental and
consequential damages, but less costs saved due to the breach. 2 75 If the
purchaser has accepted delivery of goods which prove to be defective,
then it may recover the difference between the value of the goods had
they been delivered as warranted and their actual value, plus perhaps
incidental and consequential damages. 27 6 Consequential damages con-
sist of losses to person or property caused by a breach that the seller had
reason to know would occur and which "cover" could not have pre-
vented. 27 7 Incidental damages consist of any reasonable expenditures
for the care and custody of rejected goods, cover and other reasonable
274. See R. BERNACCHI & G. LARSEN, supra note 272, at 136-37; Wallace &
Maher, supra note 8, at 59 n.1 & 61-63. For example, a computer system
purchased by one small businessman was delivered two months late and "dead
on arrival". The businessman was consequently forced to liquidate his newly
formed company and sell his family's two hundred-year old farm in order to pay
his $1.2 million debt. Wallace & Maher, supra note 8, at 59-60 n. .
One commentator sarcastically but correctly indicated that "[t]he capacity
of machines for error is vastly greater than ours. A computer can ... make more
mistakes in the fraction of a second than a human in a lifetime." Rumbelow,
Liability for Programming Errors, 9 INT'L Bus. L. 303, 303 (1981). Computer
"glitches" are capable of creating such chaos that monolithic institutions such as
the London Stock Exchange and the New York Stock Exchange have almost
been brought to a grinding halt. See Glitches, New York Times, Oct. 28, 1986, at
47, col. 1-6; System Failure, Time, Feb. 8, 1988, at 52, col. 3.
275. U.C.C. § 2-713 (1978).
276. U.C.C. § 2-714 (1978). The U.C.C. states:
(1) Where the buyer has accepted goods and given notification
(subsection (3) of Section 2-607) he may recover as damages for any
nonconformity of tender the loss resulting in the ordinary course of
events from the seller's breach as determined in any manner which is
reasonable.
(2) The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the differ-
ence at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods
accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as war-
ranted, unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a dif-
ferent amount.
(3) In a proper case any incidental and consequential damages
under the next section may also be recovered.
Id.
277. U.C.C. § 2-715(2) (1978). The U.C.C. states:
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach
include
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular require-
ments and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had rea-
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expenses. 2 7
8
The U.C.C. provides that the purchaser must cover;2 79 however,
failure to cover does not prevent the purchaser from seeking other rem-
edies. 28 0 Furthermore, the U.C.C. promotes the liberal administration
of its remedies in order to put the aggrieved party "in as good a position
as if the other party had fully performed."
28
'
The issue of whether goods are impaired and the plaintiff has suf-
fered injury is generally recognized as a factual question.282 Once the
son to know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or
otherwise; and
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from
any breach of warranty.
Id.
278. U.C.C. § 2-715(1) (1978). The U.C.C. states: "Incidental damages re-
sulting from the seller's breach include expenses reasonably incurred in inspec-
tion, receipt, transportation and care and custody of goods rightfully rejected,
any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in connection
with effecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident to the delay or
other breach." Id.
279. U.C.C. § 2-711(1) (1978). The U.C.C. states:
(1) Where the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or the
buyer rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance then with re-
spect to any goods involved, and with respect to the whole if the breach
goes to the whole contract (Section 2-612), the buyer may cancel and
whether or not he has done so may in addition to recovering so much
of the price as has been paid
(a) "cover" and have damages under the next section as to
all the goods affected whether or not they have been identified to the
contract; or
(b) recover damages for non-delivery as provided in this Ar-
ticle (Section 2-713).
Id.
The U.C.C. also provides that the aggrieved party must make efforts to miti-
gate damages. U.C.C. § 1-106 comment 1 (1978).
280. U.C.C. § 2-712 (1978). The U.C.C. states:
(1) After a breach within the preceding section the buyer may
"cover" by making in good faith and without unreasonable delay any
reasonable purchase of or contract to purchase goods in substitution
for those due from the seller.
(2) The buyer may recover from the seller as damages the differ-
ence between the cost of cover and the contract price together with any
incidental or consequential damages as hereinafter defined (Section 2-
715), but less expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach.
(3) Failure of the buyer to effect cover within this section does
not bar him from any other remedy.
Id.
281. U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1978). The U.C.C. states:
(1) The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally adminis-
tered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a posi-
tion as if the other party had fully performed but neither consequential
or special nor penal damages may be had except as specifically pro-
vided in this Act or by other rule of law.
Id.
282. See, e.g., Management Sys. Assocs. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 762
880 [Vol. 33: p. 835
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fact finder has determined that the plaintiff has suffered an injury, then
the plaintiff is entitled to at least nominal damages. 2 83 Furthermore, if
the vendor breaches a computer contract, then the purchaser may re-
cover the difference between the fair market value of the goods accepted
and the value the goods would have had if they had been delivered as
warranted. 28 4
Usually courts equate the purchase price with the value of the prod-
uct if it had been as warranted. 28 5 However, in special circumstances,
courts may use other measures. 28 6 Sometimes the value of the product
if it had been as warranted is several times the purchase price, and the
aggrieved party may recover disproportionate damages under the bene-
F.2d 1161, 1180 (4th Cir. 1985) (lower court should have allowed question to go
to jury); Aubrey's R.V. Center, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 46 Wash. App. 595, 598,
731 P.2d 1124, 1128 (1987) (construing Washington version of the U.C.C.,
WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-608 (1966)) (substantial impairment is factual
question).
283. Management Sys. Assocs. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 762 F.2d
1161, 1180 (4th Cir. 1985). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit stated:
The principle that the violation of a legal right entitles a party to at
least nominal damages has been applied to establish that "[i]n a suit for
damages for breach of contract, proof of the breach would entitle the
plaintiff to nominal damages at least." . . We hold that plaintiff's evi-
dence of breach of the construction contract was sufficient to go to the
jury despite the fact that no damages were shown. The evidence estab-
lished a prima facie case of breach of contract entitling defendant to at
least nominal damages.
Id. (citations omitted)
284. Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 670 F.2d 1304,
1309 (3d Cir. 1980) (construing U.C.C. § 2-714(2) (1978)); see also Schatz Dis-
trib. Co. v. Olivetti Corp. of Am., 7 Kan. App. 2d 676, 679, 647 P.2d 820, 825
(1982) (construing KAN. U.C.C. ANN. § 2-714(2) (Vernon 1973)) ("Subsection
(2) is generally in accord with the common law concept that damages in case of a
breach of warranty are ordinarily the difference between the value of the article
delivered and what it would have been worth had it been as warranted.").
In Schatz, Schatz Distributing Company, Inc. (Schatz), agreed to purchase a
computer system from Olivetti Corporation of America, (Olivetti) based on an
Olivetti sales representative's oral and written representations that the Olivetti
computer could perform specific accounting functions. Id. at 677, 647 P.2d at
822. Olivetti located a custom programmer for Schatz who, in spite of working
with several Olivetti employees over a period of time, was unable to get the
system to work satisfactorily. Id. at 677, 647 P.2d at 822-23. Olivetti offered to
locate a purchaser of the system at a reduced price, and sell another more ex-
pensive model to Schatz. Id. at 678, 647 P.2d at 823. Schatz refused and
brought suit against Olivetti, claiming violation of express warranties and the
implied warranty of merchantability and seeking consequential damages. Id. at
678, 647 P.2d at 823.
285. Schatz, 7 Kan. App. 2d at 680, 647 P.2d at 825.
286. Neilson Business Equip. Center, Inc. v. Monteleone, 524 A.2d 1172,
1176 (Del. 1987) (construing U.C.C. § 2-714(2) (1978)). Such "special circum-
stances" may consist of a lease arrangement where the lessee pays in install-
ments. Id.
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fit of the bargain theory.2 8 7 Although the risk of this penalty may dis-
courage sales by small computer companies, the parties may agree to
contractually limit the vendor's total liability and lower the contract
price as its consideration.
2 8 8
In some cases, the aggrieved party may recover incidental and con-
sequential damages as well.28 9 In order for the plaintiff to recover con-
sequential damages, the defendant must have had reason to know that
the plaintiff would incur those damages in the event of the defendant's
breach.2 90
Consequential damages may include economic damages, such as
loss of goodwill 2 9 1 or they may consist of increased labor costs attributa-
287. RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543, 550 (9th Cir. 1985)
(Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). One dissenting judge had
profound conceptual difficulties with this phenomenon. See Chatlos Sys. v. Na-
tional Cash Register Corp., 670 F.2d 1304, 1307-08 (3d Cir. 1980) (Rosenn,J.,
dissenting). The dissenting judge stated:
[U]nder [the] benefit of the bargain theory the fair market value of the
goods as warranted was several times the purchase price .... I believe
there is no probative evidence to support the district court's award of
damages for the breach of warranty in a sum amounting to almost five
times the purchase price of the goods. The measure of damages also
has been misapplied and this could have a significant effect in the mar-
ketplace, especially for the unique and burgeoning computer industry.
Id.
The Kansas Supreme Court has stated:
Without incidental and consequential damages [the] goal [of U.C.C.
§ 1-106 (1978)] would be unreachable in many cases.... The availabil-
ity of consequential damages is vital. It may mean the difference be-
tween recovering one dollar, and one million dollars, the damages
caused as a result of the defective part, in personal injury, lost profits,
and more.
Cricket Alley Corp. v. Data Terminal Sys., 240 Kan. 661, 665, 732 P.2d 719, 725
(1987).
288. RRX, 772 F.2d at 550 (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). For a discussion of contractual limitations of total liability, see supra notes
176-87 and accompanying text.
289. Consolidated Data Terminals v. Applied Digital Data Sys., 708 F.2d
385, 392 (9th Cir. 1983) (construing U.C.C. § 2-715 (1978)). Incidental and
consequential damages may also be contractually excluded. Id. at 392-93. For a
discussion of contractual damage disclaimers, see supra notes 176-87 and accom-
panying text.
290. Id. at 393-94.
291. Id. The Consolidated Data court stated:
Under these rules CDT was entitled to recover .... [a]s conse-
quential damages ... all losses that ADDS had reason to know CDT
would incur as a result of a wholesale breach of warranty on the Regent
units. Knowing that CDT was a distributor of computer equipment,
ADDS had reason to know that if it supplied poor quality merchandise
that failed to conform to product specifications, CDT would suffer a
loss of goodwill with its customers because the customers would blame
CDT for the product failures, and would become more reluctant to buy
equipment for CDT in the future.
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ble to the failure of the bargained-for computer system. 292 They may
also include finance charges associated with a third-party lease arrange-
ment2 93 or even sales tax arising from the purchase of the computer
system.2
94
The aggrieved party must also abide by the cover provisions of the
U.C.C. If it fails to cover, a plaintiff may not recover damages which
result after it learns of the breach. 2 95 Finally, the aggrieved party will
not be awarded punitive damages under any contract theory, regardless
of whether the breach is found to be gross or even willful. 296 It should
292. Cricket Alley Corp. v. Data Terminal Sys., 240 Kan. 661, 665, 732
P.2d 719, 724 (1987) (construing KAN. U.C.C. ANN. §§ 84-2-714 and -715
(Vernon 1973)). In Cricket Alley the defendant argued that such increased labor
costs were due to unique features of the plaintiff's business, and the defendant,
therefore, could not have known that they would arise in the event of its breach.
Id. at 666, 732 P.2d at 725. The Kansas Supreme Court responded to this argu-
ment by holding that this is a common injury suffered by retail stores when a
computer contract has been breached. Id. (construing KAN. U.C.C. ANN. § 84-2-
715(2)(a) (Vernon 1973)).
293. See Aubrey's R.V. Center, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 46 Wash. App. 595,
600, 731 P.2d 1124, 1131 (1987); Schatz Distrib. Co. v. Olivetti Corp. of Am., 7
Kan. App. 2d 676, 680, 647 P.2d 820, 826 (1982) (quoting Hudson v. Dave Mc-
Intire, Inc., 390 N.E.2d 179, 184 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979)).
The Washington Court of Appeals has stated:
The inclusion of finance charges within [U.C.C. § 2-714's] basic mea-
sure of damages overcompensates the buyer. Likewise, finance charges
are not includable as incidental or consequential damages as they do
not result from or arise incident to the breach.
[However, t]he objective behind awarding damages to a buyer who
justifiably revokes acceptance is different. There, the buyer is not
merely seeking the benefit of his or her bargain. Rather, the buyer
seeks to be restored to the position he or she would have been in if the
contract had never been entered into. Thus, the objective of this rem-
edy is primarily restitution. The measure of damages used to achieve
this goal entitles the buyer not only to the return of the purchase, but
also any expenses incurred by the buyer in reasonable reliance upon
the contract, plus incidental and consequential damages arising from
the breach.
Aubrey's, 46 Wash. App. at 599-600, 731 P.2d at 1131.
294. Schatz, 7 Kan. App. 2d at 680, 647 P.2d at 826 (quoting Hudson v.
Dave McIntire, Inc., 390 N.E.2d 179, 184 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979)).
295. AccuSystems, Inc. v. Honeywell Information Sys., 580 F. Supp. 474,
483 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York stated:
However, plaintiffs took no steps to mitigate their damages. Indeed,
they continued to experiment ... until AccuSystems went out of busi-
ness late in 1982. In view of the disclosure [by a Honeywell employee
that the TL-6 operating system would not work as had been repre-
sented by Honeywell], plaintiffs could have terminated their efforts to
make the TL-6 system operate and sought other equipment which
would enable them to continue in business. Having failed to do so,
they cannot hold Honeywell responsible for damages after [the date of
the disclosure].
Id. (citations omitted).
296. Consolidated Data Terminals v. Applied Digital Data Sys., 708 F.2d
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be noted, however, that courts will impose attorney fees and single or
double costs as sanctions for bringing a frivolous action. 2 9
7
2. Damages Available Under Other Theories
Generally, punitive damages are available under fraud and misrep-
resentation theories. Furthermore, courts will award lost profits, that is,
"benefit of the bargain" damages, only where the breaching party's false
representations were malicious or wanton, or its conduct was actuated
by evil motives. 2 98 However, courts are in some cases reluctant to
award economic losses where the aggrieved party can be sufficiently
compensated under the U.C.C.
29 9
E. Computer Malpractice
Computer technology is evolving and progressing at such a rapid
rate that members of the computer industry are the only ones able to
keep abreast of all of the daily advancements. 30 0 However, even manu-
facturers and vendors find that it is impossible to stay fully informed of
currently available computer products, pending product introductions,
product capabilities, pricing and other industry developments.3 0 1 The
number and diversity of computer products are so overwhelming that it
is safe to say that computer purchasers are generally uninformed, if not
naive, about computers.
It is apparent that computer purchasers know far less than com-
puter professionals. Because of this disparity in the level of expertise of
the computer purchaser and vendor, and because traditional tort and
contract theories are often inadequate for resolving legal problems in-
385, 399 (9th Cir. 1983). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit stated: "[Only i]f CDT upon remand can establish that ADDS was guilty
of fraud, malice, or oppression ... , the district court [can] . . . award punitive
damages upon that basis in such amount as shall seem reasonably appropriate."
Id. (citation omitted).
297. RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543, 547 (9th Cir. 1985).
The Ninth Circuit stated: "An appeal is frivolous where the result is obvious or
the appellants' arguments are utterly meritless." Id. (citing FED. R. APP. P. 38;
28 U.S.C. § 1912 (1982)).
298. AccuSystems, 580 F. Supp. at 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
299. Office Supply Co. v. Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776, 789 (E.D.
Wis. 1982). The court stated:
Under California law economic losses are not recoverable in tort.
The rationale is explained [as follows]:
Where the suit is between a nonperforming seller and an aggrieved
buyer and the injury consists of damage to the goods themselves and
the costs of repair of such damage or a loss of profits that the deal had
been expected to yield to the buyer, it would be sensible to limit the
buyer's rights to those provided by the Uniform Commercial Code.
Id. at 791 (quoting S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363, 1376
(9th Cir. 1978)) (citations omitted).
300. See Gordon & Starr, supra note 15, at 511.
301. Comment, supra note 8, at 1070.
884 [Vol. 33: p. 835
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volving computers, it is submitted that dissatisfied purchasers need a
more effective cause of action, specifically computer malpractice, to re-
solve their legal difficulties. As between experts and laymen, those who
represent themselves as knowledgeable in the field of computers should
bear the risk of computer failure. 30 2
In two cases, courts have addressed the issue whether computer
malpractice should be a viable cause of action.30 3 This cause of action
places computer vendors in the same professional context as physicians,
attorneys, accountants, architects and engineers, 30 4 and holds "com-
puter professionals" to a higher standard of care than a mere reasona-
bleness standard.3 0 5 Such a cause of action would vitiate contractual
damage and warranty disclaimers, 30 6 thereby enabling dissatisfied pur-
chasers to recover losses when other legal remedies are ineffective or
inadequate.
302. Gordon & Starr, supra note 15, at 511; Comment, supra note 8, at
1070.
303. See Chatlos Sys. v. National Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738
(D.N.J. 1979), rev'd and remanded, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir.) (rejected theory), aff'd,
670 F.2d 1304 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1112 (1982); Triangle Under-
writers, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1981) (rejected theory).
In a third case, F & M Schaefer Corp. v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 430 F.
Supp. 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd without opinion, 614 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1979),
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York suggested
in a pretrial ruling that computer programmers are comparable to architects and
accountants for statute of limitations tolling purposes. See transcript of oral pre-
trial ruling, No. 77-3982, 175-76 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 1977). The court made no
other analogies and subsequently decided the case on other grounds. Conse-
quently, Schaefer does not serve as precedent in the context of computer mal-
practice, and as such, it will not be further discussed in this Comment.
In 1985, the California Assembly attempted to legislate a form of computer
malpractice. See Tong, Computer Lemon Law Proposed, Tribune (Oakland, Cal.),
May 17, 1985. Assemblywoman Gloria Molia, a Democrat from Los Angeles,
proposed a bill in a California Assembly Consumer Protection Committee meet-
ing which would have required computer retailers and manufacturers to provide
to consumers a disclosure form that lists each computer product's capabilities.
Id. The bill provided that if the computer product fails to live up to the claims
made in the form, the consumer can have the product replaced or refunded
within one month of its purchase. Id. The bill was stalled by other Assembly
members and several computer industry associations such as ABCD, The
Microcomputer Industry Association, see infra note 318 and accompanying text,
who indicated that the California Assembly already provides remedies to the
consumer, and that such a law would unfairly single out the computer industry
for "special treatment." Id.
304. See Gordon & Starr, supra note 15, at 511; Comment, supra note 6, at
286; Tanenbaum, supra note 13, at 488. Malpractice standards have also been
applied to dentists, pharmacists, veterinarians, abstractors of title, pilots, nurses,
chiropractors, and other professionals. Conley, Software Vendor Tort Liability, 13
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 23, 23 (1987).
305. See Gordon & Starr, supra note 15, at 511-12; Tanenbaum, supra note
13, at 488; Comment, supra note 6, at 286-87.
306. See Gordon & Starr, supra note 15, at 511-12; Comment, supra note 6,
at 286-87.
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Under traditional malpractice principles, professionals must exer-
cise reasonable care and the measure of skill and knowledge ordinarily
possessed by members in good standing in that profession. 30 7 "Profes-
sions" are characterized as: (1) based on a well defined body of knowl-
edge; (2) limited to those individuals with high standards of behavior
and competence; (3) having at least one association which promotes
these high standards; (4) guided by a code of ethics; and (5) whose
members assume a high degree of personal responsibility to act in an
ethical way toward society in general and their clients in particular. 30 8
As a corollary, the typical professional malpractice action consists of the
following elements: (A) the defendant has an elevated legal duty of care
(B) which was breached by action or inaction, (C) thereby proximately
causing (D) damage or injury to the plaintiff.3 0 9
Commentators have suggested that unlike physicians, attorneys, ac-
countants, architects, engineers and others, members of the computer
industry do not engage in a profession.3 10 It is submitted that this con-
clusion is false and that its proponents rely upon fallacious reasoning.
The computer industry is indeed a profession, for it satisfies each of the
above mentioned characteristics of a profession.
First, the computer industry is based on a well defined body of
knowledge; however, this body of knowledge is constantly expanding.
At any moment the amount of this information is so vast that no single
member of the industry can claim to know its entirety. Rather, individ-
ual members know only relatively small portions of the available infor-
mation and they can learn what they do not already know by either
consulting with other members or referring to a plethora of written or
"stored" information. Thus, each member of the computer industry is a
"specialist" and each "practices" a specialty such as software or hard-
ware research, development, sales or marketing.
Physicians, attorneys, accountants, architects, engineers and others
also possess only a limited amount of information regarding their re-
spective professions. The members of each of these professions often
specialize their practices, and refer to other members or to stored infor-
mation to learn what they do not already know. Thus, the computer
307. See Gordon & Starr, supra note 15, at 511-12; Tanenbaum, supra note
13, at 503-04.
308. Galler, Contracting Problems in the Computer Industry: Should Computer Spe-
cialists Be Subjected to Malpractice Liability?, 50 INS. COUNS. J. 574, 592 (1983). See
also Comment, supra note 8, at 1078.
309. Galler, supra note 308, at 589; Comment, supra note 8, at 1083.
310. Conley, supra note 304, at 26 (profession characteristics (4) and (5)
absent from computer industry); Galler, supra note 308, at 592-95 (all character-
istics absent except (3)); Tanenbaum, supra note 13, at 488 (characteristic (4)
absent). Contra Weyrauch, Applying the "Continuous Treatment" Doctrine to Data
Processing, 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 703, 706 n.26 (1982) (non-profession argument cur-
rently "unconvincing" given prevalent computer use).
886 [Vol. 33: p. 835
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industry is analogous to more traditional professions in that it possesses
a well defined body of knowledge.
It is further submitted that the computer industry is based on a well
defined body of knowledge insofar as computer information is subject to
technological advancements which are knowable by members of the in-
dustry. Similarly, more traditional professions are based on bodies of
knowledge which are generally expanding due to scientific advance-
ments, except perhaps the fields of accounting, law and psychiatry,
which are based on subjective and artificial principles.
One commentator has suggested that a distinction should be drawn
between the computer industry and traditional professions, insofar as
members of the latter group must attend specialized institutions of
higher education that teach a relatively standard curriculum and that
members of the former group are not required to do so. 3 11 This charac-
terization is based on either a false premise or an artificial distinction at
best.
There is no question that physicians must undergo an extensive,
rigorous and relatively standard higher education. Additionally, attor-
neys must undergo standard higher education in all states except Cali-
fornia. However, accountants, architects, engineers, pharmacists,
nurses and other professionals may practice their respective professions
after having received only an undergraduate education. Additionally,
abstracters of title, chiropractors and pilots may fulfill their educational
requirements in a period of just two years or less. Yet, all of the above
are designated "professions" and their members are subject to malprac-
tice lawsuits.
Members of the computer industry do not categorically undergo ex-
tensive, standard higher education. Rather, discrete groups within the
industry such as electrical engineers, software engineers, metallurgical
engineers and others must obtain at least an undergraduate degree in
fields which offer a relatively standard curriculum. Additionally, they
may, and often do, obtain advanced degrees prior to or during their
employment by computer hardware or software manufacturers. Fur-
thermore, engineers within the computer industry are subject to mal-
practice suits regardless of their involvement in the computer industry.
Members of the computer industry who are involved in marketing
must also receive undergraduate degrees and often advanced business
degrees prior to their employment. Computer salespeople are also gen-
erally required to possess an undergraduate degree prior to their em-
ployment. However, they need not study any particular curriculum.
Technicians-computer repair and maintenance people-are the
only members of the computer industry who need not obtain an under-
graduate degree prior to their employment. Two computer industry as-
sociations, the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) and the
311. Galler, supra note 308, at 592.
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Data Processing Management Association (DPMA), have both sought,
but failed, to establish a standard curriculum for computer technicians.
Currently, technicians are generally required to obtain a one-year tech-
nical electronics degree beyond their high-school education. In addi-
tion, during the course of their employment by distributors and
retailers, technicians-as well as salespeople-almost invariably attend a
number of training courses sponsored by manufacturers of various com-
puter products.
Each technician training course is an intensive "hands-on" class
which lasts for approximately one week, and teaches the repair and
maintenance of a subsection of each manufacturer's total line of avail-
able computer products. Technicians generally attend one or more
training classes sponsored by each major computer manufacturer, and
learn in great detail about the workings of most computer products they
must eventually repair and maintain. Furthermore, distributors and re-
tailers receive confidential technical periodicals from each computer
manufacturer whose products they sell. These periodicals provide an
additional base of stored information for technicians.
Thus, the above mentioned "higher education" distinction is artifi-
cial or arguably false. Not all members of traditional professions must
attend specialized institutions of higher learning for an extended period
of time. Furthermore, members of the computer industry are not
"stuffed with hasty and far from professional computing skills." 31 2
Rather, they receive substantially more education than nonprofession-
als, and their training often rivals the education received by most mem-
bers of traditional professions.
Second, the computer industry is limited to those individuals with
high standards of behavior and competence. Members of the computer
industry are generally highly motivated and committed workers who are
keenly aware of their customers and civic responsibilities.3 13 They are
also self-professed "workaholics" who would, in the words of one ex-
pert, "rather do this than stock a dairy case."'3 14 Thus, the computer
industry is analogous to other traditional professions, insofar as both
sets of members attempt to derive some type of personal and social sat-
isfaction from their efforts.3 15
312. Id. at 592.
313. Responding to the Early Warning Signs, Computer & Software News, Nov.
9, 1987, at 139.
314. Id. (quoting Peter Peterson, Executive Vice President of WordPerfect,
a software manufacturer). See also Burnout, supra note 3, at 139 ("[A]s a company
gets'successful, you've got to get your people to realize that it's a marathon
they're in. You don't want them to become one dimensional .... ").
315. It is undisputed that there are some members of all traditional profes-
sions as well as the computer industry who are entirely self-serving. However,
these unscrupulous professionals represent exceptions to the rule that profes-
sions are comprised of individuals who abide by high standards of behavior and
competence.
[Vol. 33: p. 835888
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Third and finally, the computer industry has at least one association
which promotes high standards of behavior and competence, and has
established ethical norms for the industry.3 16 For example, a group of
twelve of the largest computer mail-order firms have formed a trade
group that plans to establish a set of business guidelines protecting the
interests of both their members and consumers. 3 17 Additionally,
ABCD, The Microcomputer Industry Association, has established a code
of ethical standards which currently affects approximately twenty-five
percent of the computer industry.318 These organizations' efforts re-
flect computer professionals' recognition that consumers know substan-
tially less than computer professionals know about computers. 31 9 Thus,
it is submitted that members of the computer industry are attempting to
become recognized as professionals, thereby requiring all of the indus-
try's members to act according to higher ethical standards. Yet courts
that have considered this issue refuse to place members of the computer
industry under the same scrutiny as other professionals.
In Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp.,3 20 the United
316. Gordon & Starr, supra note 15, at 511.
317. Computer Reseller News, Nov. 2, 1987, at 4, col. 2. One member of
the group stated: "[W]e're going to ... [determine] how we can police the
[mail-order] activity with certain consistent ethical standards ...... Id. (quoting
Matt Smith, vice president of operations ofJDR Microdevices, Inc.).
318. Telephone interview with Bernard F. Whalen, Executive Vice Presi-
dent of ABCD, The Microcomputer Industry Association (Feb. 3, 1988). ABCD
is a not-for-profit organization, and it is currently attempting to foster high
levels of professional competence among individuals within the computer indus-
try by enforcing several codes of business ethics which were drafted by members
of the computer industry. Id. Manufacturers, distributors, retailers, software
developers, and systems houses each must abide by an ABCD specialized code
of ethical standards, and a member who repeatedly violates its governing code is
subject to expulsion from the organization but may still stay in business. Id.
ABCD also functions as a complaint resolution committee and a lobbying organ-
ization for the computer industry as a whole. Id. ABCD's headquarters are lo-
cated at 1515 Woodfield Road, Suite 860, Schaumburg, Illinois 60173-5437.
The Institute for the Certification of Computer Professionals (ICCP) is also
currently attempting to standardize conduct within the computer industry.
Comment, supra note 5, at 1071. ICCP offers licenses such as the Certificate in
Data Processing. Id. However, their efforts to standardize the industry have
largely been ignored. Id. In addition, ACM at one time issued a Proposed Code
of Conduct, but the code has long since been abandoned. See 5 COMPUTER L.
SERV. (Callaghan) App. 7-3C at 1-39 (1968-80).
One commentator suggests that members of the computer industry should
be regulated under a licensing scheme, because they are indeed members of a
profession. See O'Connor, Computer Professionals: The Need for State Licensing, 18
JURIMETRICSJ. 256, 263-67 (1978).
319. Gordon & Starr, supra note 15, at 511.
320. 479 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.J. 1979), rev'd as to damages, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d
Cir.), aff'd, 670 F.2d 1304 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1112 (1982).
Chatlos Sys., Inc. (Chatlos) consulted with several computer vendors and manu-
facturers before it eventually purchased computer hardware and software from
National Cash Register Corporation (NCR). 479 F. Supp. at 741. An NCR sales
representative indicated prior to the sale that the system selected by Chatlos
1988] COMMENT 889
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States District Court for the District of New Jersey refused to analogize
computer vendors to other professionals. 32' The court stated "[s]imply
because an activity is technically complex and important to the business
community does not mean that greater potential liability must at-
tach."' 32 2 However, this decision ignores the total trust and confidence
that computer purchasers often place in vendors. 323
In Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc. ,324 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit similarly rejected the notion
that computer vendors should be classified as professionals. 3 25 This
classification is properly a function of the "trust and reliance that exists
between a lay plaintiff and a professional defendant. ' 32 6 In the case of
attorney malpractice, it is presumed that "[t]he client is hardly in a posi-
tion to know the intricacies of the practice or whether the necessary
steps in the action have been taken."'3 27 In the case of architect mal-
practice, "generally the client is required to rely almost totally on the
professional advice of the architect. He must have confidence in the ar-
would perform six business operations and store data on NCR's latest technol-
ogy magnetic discs. Id. The NCR representative also stated that NCR's disc
system was a good investment, insofar as it would solve inventory problems and
result in direct savings to Chatlos. Id. NCR further represented that the system
would be programmed by NCR personnel who would have the system "up and
running" within six months of its purchase by Chatlos. Id. Subsequently, none
of the above representations made by NCR were satisfied. Id.
321. Id. at 740-41 n.1.
322. Id.
323. It is submitted that, because the computer industry is so highly com-
petitive, manufacturers and vendors have forsaken the "old school" of salesman-
ship and have replaced it with more savvy, and less heavy-handed, sales
techniques. The "new school" of salesmanship includes, in many cases, be-
friending customers for the purpose of evoking their trust and confidence and in
order to effectuate sales. In the experience of the author, those salespeople in
the computer industry who subscribe to the "new school" are more successful
than their "old school" counterparts. Consequently, salespeople who are mem-
bers of the old-fashioned camp are adopting the more modern approach to
salesmanship or are being replaced.
324. 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979), aff'd after remand, 651 F.2d 132 (2d Cir.
1981). For a discussion of the facts and holding in Triangle, see supra note 119.
325. Id. at 745-46. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit refused to apply the principle of "continuous treatment" to a vaporware
case in order to toll the statute of limitations. The court stated:
The 'continuous treatment' concept [holds] . . . that in a suit for mal-
practice of physicians and nurses in a city hospital, the statute of limita-
tions began to run 'at the end of continuous treatment or hospital-
patient or physician-patient relationship,' and not at the last date of
malpractice. . . . '[Clontinuous treatment' [is]: '. . . treatment for the
same or related illnesses for injuries, continuing after the alleged acts
of malpractice, not mere continuity of a general physician-patient
relationship.'
Id. at 744 (quoting Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 237 N.Y.S.2d
319, 187 N.E.2d 777 (1962)).
326. Id. at 744-45.
327. Id. at 745 n.15.
890 [Vol. 33: p. 835
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chitect and place his full trust in him."' 328 Consequently, the court was
unwilling to "[clothe] sellers or manufacturers of machinery in the garb
of members of the learned professions. '32 9 To allow the plaintiff's con-
tention, "and apply [malpractice concepts] generally to the law of com-
mercial sales, would open Pandora's box .... -330
As in Chatlos, the Triangle court ignored the unique relationship of
trust that exists between computer purchasers and vendors. The court
also ignored the disparity in knowledge between the parties to computer
contracts that is so common to the practice of law. Finally, the court
underestimated the time and effort that computer vendors expend to-
ward learning enough about computers and their capabilities in order to
satisfy their customers' demands. Although computer salespeople are
neither formally educated nor certified, their relative level of expertise
should earn them the right to be recognized as professionals.
If members of the computer industry become recognized as profes-
sionals, and a malpractice cause of action becomes available to dissatis-
fied computer purchasers, then plaintiffs may enjoy certain procedural
advantages. For example, in some states the statute of limitations may
be longer for malpractice claims than for other tort or contract
claims. 33 ' Furthermore, the relevant statute of limitations may be
delayed for a malpractice claim under tolling principles such as fraudu-
lent concealment or the continuous treatment doctrine. 3 32
Plaintiffs in computer malpractice claims may enjoy substantive ad-
vantages as well. For example, plaintiffs who are not in privity with sell-
ers may recover for their economic loss; in strict liability claims they
cannot.3 33 Sellers in computer malpractice claims may not be able to
contractually limit or exclude damages or limit the purchaser's reme-
dies. 3 34 Plaintiffs may not need to aver or prove scienter, as they must
in fraud and misrepresentation claims. 33 5 Finally, defendants will not
be able to argue that their statements were merely opinion and not fact,
for courts may regard such distinctions as irrelevant.3 36
It is submitted that the enhanced judicial regulation that would re-
sult if computer sellers were viewed as professionals would protect the
328. Id. (quoting County of Broome v. VincentJ. Smith, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d
889, 358 N.Y.S.2d 998 (1974)).
329. Id. It is submitted that during its infancy, the computer industry was
not a "learned profession." However, the computer industry is now in its ado-
lescence, see supra notes 18 & 40, and as such, it is submitted that it has indeed
become a "learned profession."
330. Id. at 746.
331. Galler, supra note 308, at 589.
332. Id.; Conley, supra note 304, at 26.
333. Conley, supra note 304, at 26.
334. Galler, supra note 308, at 589.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 589-90.
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public interest. 33 7 It is further submitted that the time is ripe for estab-
lishing a paradigm for holding negligent or unscrupulous computer pro-
fessionals liable for their actions. Computer malpractice should apply
when it is clear that the consumer relied on the skill and judgment of the
professional in selecting a defective system.
IV. CONCLUSION
The chasm which divides the average purchaser's knowledge about
computers from that knowledge possessed by manufacturers, distribu-
tors and retailers suggests that the environment surrounding computer
sales is currently unlike that surrounding the sale of almost all other
items. This disparity provides a unique opportunity for the seller to
have its way with an unsuspecting buyer.
Standard form agreements only perpetuate the disparity of bargain-
ing power which is inherent in computer sales. It is submitted that,
although courts have thus far been unwilling to review these form agree-
ments in light of principles of unconscionability, the judiciary should
apply the doctrine of unconscionability more liberally, as it does in other
areas of the law. But not all computer sales involving standard contracts
should be interpreted under an unconscionability analysis.
Courts should invoke other portions of the U.C.C. for all transac-
tions between large commercial entities, and for all transactions in
which a computer company of any size purchases computer equipment.
The doctrine of unconscionability should be applied only in compelling
cases involving purchasers that are individuals or relatively small busi-
ness entities that are not members of the computer industry. Courts
should carefully analyze the setting of each computer sale involving at
least one individual purchaser or one relatively small commercial entity
that is not a member of the computer industry, in order to determine
whether to invoke substantive or procedural unconscionability as in
other areas of the law. Further, courts should refrain from superficially
categorizing plaintiffs in vaporware cases as "commercial entities," or as
individuals with a "college education," or with some computer back-
ground, and should scrutinize each party's relative bargaining power
and relative computer expertise.
Finally, it is submitted that the judiciary should be more amenable
to computer tort claims, and adopt computer malpractice as a viable
cause of action. This new tort will require the judiciary to carefully ana-
lyze the facts of each transaction and resist the temptation of cursorily
classifying the parties into general categories. This increased potential
liability will not stifle computer research and development. Rather, in-
creased judicial sensitivity in the area of computer sales will remove
337. Comment, supra note 5, at 1071.
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some of the fear and resentment that purchasers have toward computers
and thereby promote computer sales.
Ronald N. Weikers
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